

Fig. 1: An early 1954 NATO map showing the North Atlantic area. (*Source:* Lord Ismay, NATO, *The First Five Years, 1949-1954*. Utrecht, Bosch, 1954).

The iconography and circulation of the Atlantic community

"The transatlantic alliance between the United States and Canada, on the one side, and the majority of the countries of Europe, on the other side, is held together by a formal commitment, a legal bond. ... To look only to the explicit bonds of obligation or the official consultative arrangements between the United States, in particular, and the countries and organizations of Europe as the source of the cohesion that does, at most times, exist between the continents of America and Europe would, surely, be to miss much of the substance of the connection. ... Gottmann seeks, in analytical fashion, to lay bare the structure of the icons of identity and the circles of activity that shape, and reshape, communities over time."

Alan K. Henrikson

Professor Henrikson teaches American diplomatic history, contemporary US-European relations, and a seminar on geography, foreign policy, and world order at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA. During the Spring of 2003 he was Fulbright/Diplomatic Academy Visiting Professor of International Relations at the Diplomatische Akademie in Vienna. His collaboration with the geographer Jean Gottmann began with his participation in the International Political Science Association's Round Table on the "center and periphery" theme in Paris at the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques in 1978, and his ensuing contribution, "America's changing place in the world," to the volume, Centre and Periphery: Spatial Variation in Politics *(1980), edited by Gottmann. He also contributed " 'A small, cozy town, global in scope': Washington, DC," an article for a thematic issue on "capital cities" that Professor Gottmann organized for* Ekistics, *vol. 50, no. 299 (March/April 1983). The author's present essay is based in part on his chapter, "The role of metropolitan regions in making a new Atlantic community," in* Ever Closer Partnership: Policy-Making in US-EU Relations, *ed. Éric Philippart and Pascaline Winand (Brussels, Presses Interuniversitaires Européennes-Peter Lang, 2001).*

The formal bonds of alliance plus the icons and circles of community

The transatlantic alliance between the United States and Canada, on the one side, and the majority of the countries of Europe, on the other side, is held together by a formal commitment, a legal bond. Commonly called the "pledge," Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949, states simply but sonorously: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all" (NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, 2001, p. 528) (fig. 1).

This expression of solidarity – resembling the Three Musketeers' pledge – does not, it should be noted, indicate the existence or require the establishment of a common identity, a single polity of the state-parties involved in defending the Atlantic area. It is, though binding, merely an international connection. Still less, perhaps, do the more recent formalizations of common interest and shared purpose made by the United States and Canada in their separate accords with the European Union – notably, the US-EU and Canada-EU Transatlantic Declarations of 1990 – create an overarching Atlantic Community or imply that one could be formed. These, too, are merely intergovernmental in character.

Yet to look only to the explicit bonds of obligation or the official consultative arrangements between the United States, in particular, and the countries and organizations of Europe as the source of the cohesion that does, at most times, exist between the continents of America and Europe would, surely, be to miss much of the substance of the connection. Even to see the explanation of transatlantic comity and cooperation as lying primarily in the field of politics and diplomacy (my own area of special interest) may not be the best way to achieve a basic understanding of what *is*, after all, an Atlantic community of sorts, a *de facto* entity if not a *de jure* one. The responsiveness of Europeans to Americans and, reciprocally (though, as we shall see, not always symmetrically), of Americans to Europeans, is clearly greater than that of any other comparable intercontinental pairing in the world. How can this be explained?

Jean Gottmann's work offers a new way of interpreting the Atlantic community, and its constituent facts and forces. Rather than attempting to define "community" itself, in an essentialist way, Gottmann seeks, in analytical fashion, to lay bare the structure of the *icons* of identity and the *circles* of activity that shape, and reshape, communities over time.

Any social system, as Gottmann posits, is a combination of "iconography" and "circulation" (GOTTMANN, 1952, pp. 219-225). His terms are correlative and, taken together, are presumably inclusive. "Iconography," as he conceives it, refers to the symbols, concrete and also abstract, that give a community its identity, that embody and express its history and values. "Circulation," by contrast but in close functional relation to iconography, refers to the flows of people, goods, and also information and ideas that nourish a community, that support and supply its life. Circles of activity, on many scales, generate the material energy of a city or a country and also cause much of its ex-



Fig. 2: Paris – The Arc de Triomphe.

Fig. 3: New York – The Statue of Liberty.



Fig. 4: Paris – View from the Arc de Triomphe, looking down onto the Place Charles de Gaulle (Etoile), showing the traffic movement – "circulation" in Gottmann's terminology.



Fig. 5: Paris – View from the Arc de Triomphe towards the Eiffel Tower.

citement, around more or less fixed icons. Gottmann calls iconography a *"principe de stabilité"* and circulation a *"principe de mouvement."* Both the iconographic, or symbolic, factor and the circulatory, or economically and socially energizing, factor are necessary for a community – a human community on any level – to cohere and to prosper. These "centripetal" and "centrifugal" forces, Gottmann suggests, must be kept in balance over historical time if not, necessarily, at every moment of crisis such as the September 11, 2001, trauma whose impact on transatlantic relations will be assessed at the end of this article.

To illustrate Gottmann's distinction between iconography and circulation, two familiar examples, one from either side of the Atlantic, may be given. The Arc de Triomphe in Paris (fig. 2) and the Statue of Liberty in New York (fig. 3) may be regarded as icons, in Gottmann's sense, of the monumental type. Both are geographical reference points, but they also have considerable historical and ideological meaning. They can orient the citizenry of Paris and New York, and also outsiders, "morally," as well as directionally. Circulation is as easily illustrated as iconography.

The traffic flowing to and from, and around, the Arc de Triomphe (figs. 4 and 5) recalling Napoleon's victories and France's unknown war dead, circles around an icon. So, too, does the movement of ships in and out of New York harbor, and also the air traffic overhead and highway traffic on surrounding shores, circulate, though more widely, around "Lady Liberty" (figs. 6, 7, 8 and 9). Generally, as Gottmann sees it, iconography is static, backward-oriented, and, on balance, conservative. Circulation, in his view, is dynamic, forward-oriented, and, most often, progressive in effect. Sometimes, of course, iconography can embody a "revolutionary" tradition, and circulation can be "congestive" rather than flowing and free. They can support each other, but they also can contradict each other. They interact, over time, with resulting changes in both.

The valuations, positive or negative, that are given to iconography and circulation are affected by history. Technology and

Fig. 6: New York – The Statue of Liberty monumental icon of the city (detail).



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Fig. 7: The Statue of Liberty as a small figure in front of the New Jersey port facilities, representing maritime "circulation." (*Source: New York: A Picture Memory,* New York, Crescent Books, 1990).

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Fig. 8: New York – The tip of Manhattan with a ferry and a sailboat – in "circulation" – in front of it. (*Source: New York: A Picture Memory,* New York, Crescent Books, 1990).



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Fig. 9: New York – General view of Manhattan's Financial District. The World Trade Center twin towers are shown, intact, in the background. (*Source: New York: A Picture Memory,* New York, Crescent Books, 1990).

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

Fig. 10: Paris – the Eiffel Tower.

the Zeitgeist can modify the very meanings of icons, just as they can accelerate and alter the directions of circulatory processes. In one of his later essays, "Transatlantic Orbits: The Interplay in the Evolution of Cities" (1986), Gottmann recalled a conversation he had with Henry Churchill, a Philadelphia friend who recently had been traveling in France. Churchill had spoken of "the gradual change" he observed. His impressions merged with Gottmann's own:

> He also referred to the symbolism of the monuments in Paris, that the Arc de Triomphe signaled the end of a long period opened by Greco-Roman architects, while the Eiffel Tower (fig. 10) heralded the new era of history opening up in our century with skyscraping, liberation from old molds, and new engineering taking over the design of the environment. Gifted artists just express the trends and traditions in the local people's spirit (GOTTMANN and HARPER, 1990, pp. 264-265).

Within the same local population, as Gottmann was delighted to note, there are generational and other differences in taste and outlook (fig. 11). He tells, for instance, of the conservative French poet, Théophile Gautier, who "took long detours around Paris to avoid the sight of the Eiffel Tower." He then adds, indicating his own preference for innovation and succession. "Similar attitudes could be observed among good Parisians in recent years towards the Centre Pompidou! The latter is, however, a loved attraction for large crowds of youngsters (GOTTMANN and HARPER, 1990, p. 256).

Most of Gottmann's specific arguments about social organization, including his iconography vs. circulation distinction, were applied by him in worked-out and detailed fashion only to particular cities such as Paris, particular regions such as the



Fig. 11: European monuments-symbols – city icons. (*Source:* "21st century views," *Europe: Magazine of the European Union,* no. 392, December/January 1999-2000).

Northeastern coastal "Megalopolis" of the United States, or particular countries such as France. His 1952 study, *La politique des États et leur géographie*, and constant travels abroad attest to his keen interest in the world, however. His interests, intellectual and geographical, were broad. He was a true global thinker. It is his half a century of personal "transhumance over the North Atlantic," as he termed it (GOTTMANN, 1952, p. 257), that truly stands out in his own life experience, geographical writing, and mental speculation.

Whether Professor Gottmann considered that an Atlantic "community" existed is difficult to know. The answer to the question is partly just a matter of definition. What is clearly evident is that he believed that, at least in the particular realm of urban discourse, "there exists one vast transatlantic orbit in which all the main planning policies, technological innovations, and methods of management are exchanged, attempted, at least debated." There was "a *common lore* of ideas and techniques," he observed, shared by all those involved in urban design on both sides of the Atlantic who "moved freely around within the transatlantic orbit." Yet, he could not but note, these transactions had not produced "a straight, generally applicable solution" to the urban problems of America and Europe. "Certainly the North Atlantic has been and remains the large portion of space on this planet most intensely crisscrossed by ships and airplanes, telephone connections and other telecommunications, people, goods, and messages," he wrote. "The results in terms of the evolution of cities are nevertheless strikingly at variance, not only between Anglo-America on the one hand and continental Europe on the other, but even on the two sides of the Channel between England and France, or between Switzerland and Belgium" (GOTTMANN and HARPER, 1990, p. 260).

This arresting description by Gottmann of "one vast transatlantic orbit" of ideological flow and human interaction, combined with recognition of the stubborn differences that continue to exist among at least the cities of the Atlantic, is consonant with the interpretation of American-European relations here offered as a plurality of transatlantic difference in ways of living and interacting. More particularly, the emphasis is here placed on local communities, especially those in and around coastal cities, on both sides of the Atlantic whose mutual perceptions and, increasingly, actual relations are making a new Atlantic community, if not an Atlantic Community with a capital "C."

An Atlanticism based on cities as well as on countries

The standard way of speaking about transatlantic relations, as indicated at the outset, is to refer to formulae of political obligation and also economic cooperation – that is, the NATO pact relationship and also the increasingly systematized relationship between the United States, as well as Canada and a number of other countries in the Western Hemisphere, and the developing European Union. The texture of transatlantic relations is both much wider and much thicker than this conventional approach suggests.

Non-central entities too – subnational governments as well as nongovernmental entities including private corporations and institutions – are actively engaged in American-European relations and, arguably, are also helping to reshape the Atlantic community. The particular analytical focus here, following Gottmann, is placed on what may be termed *metropolitan regions*. These are amalgams of local, state, and even federal authority and are also, as Gottmann demonstrated in *Megalopolis*, major manufacturing, commercial, employment, and transportation agglomerations (GOTTMANN, 1961, pp. 447-690). Arguably, these concentrations – "region states," as Kenichi Ohmae has characterized them more recently – are the most dynamic and important ones in the rapidly globalizing world economy of today (OHMAE, 1993). On both sides of the Atlantic, cities and the regions surrounding them, many with distinct "personalities," are coming to the fore.

The emergent pattern of Franco-American relations, in which Gottmann was of course especially interested, is illustrative. The New York financier Felix Rohatyn, when serving as United States Ambassador to France, told the US Conference of Mayors: "The most important thing that we can do now is to think about Europe in a new way – not just as a collection of nation-states, but as a single economic space filled with a constellation of dynamic cities and economic regions, of future customers and partners." The government of France itself, Ambassador Rohatyn pointed out, had "long recognized the importance of cities outside capitals" and, accordingly, maintained consulates in Los Angeles, Houston, Chicago, and seven other American cities. By contrast, the United States maintained only two consulates in France, one in Marseille and the other in Strasbourg. Seeking to make up the difference, Ambassador Rohatyn initiated the new approach of creating smaller American Presence Posts (APPs), staffed from the US Embassy in Paris and supported by modern communications technology, in other French cities. He set up the first APP in Lyon, "not only because it is France's second largest city, but because of its regional importance," he said. More than a hundred American firms did business in Lyon, and US trade with the Lyon region amounted to some five billion dollars a year. Recognizing that many in France (presumably Parisians) saw in globalization an American takeover threat, Rohatyn contrasted the outlook of the regions of France. "In the regions, people think differently," he said. He cited as a particular example that of Toulouse, where he also opened an APP. "Toulouse is an aerospace city, a combination of Silicon Valley and Southern California, where business activity is paramount and I think there is much more admiration for the American model and less distancing from it." The US Embassy under Ambassador Rohatyn also carried out a culturally oriented strategy for diversifying America's relations with the country. With corporate support and with the ambassador's wife, Elizabeth, in the lead, the Rohatyn team began a program of linking up regional museums in France with similarly sized and situated museums around the United States (ROHATYN, 1999; WHITNEY, 1999; RIDING, 1999). Such transatlantic partnerships could be significant, in an iconographic sense, as well as substantial, in a circulatory sense.

Cities of all sizes, especially when clustered together as metropolitan regions, are coming to be "fundamental spatial units of the global economy" and, prospectively, even "*political* actors on the world stage" (emphasis added). Far from being "dissolved away by processes of globalization," as Allen J. Scott, John Agnew, Edward W. Soja, and Michael Storper further observe, city-regions are "becoming increasingly central to modern economic and social life" and also are "beginning to consolidate politically." They are doing so in response to the need felt by individual urban centers for "region-wide coalitions" as a means of dealing with the threats and the opportunities of globalization (SCOTT, AGNEW, SOJA, and STORPER, 1999).

My hypothesis is that these vital urban centers and their associated hinterlands may play a role *internationally*, well beyond the limits of state (provincial), national, or continental lines. They can engage in region-wide coalition-building that is transoceanic in extent. Moreover, they can do so *directly*, without the mediation of national governments or of international or supranational bodies. A phenomenon that Gottmann himself noted was the "*expansion of the horizons* of urban activities." In the first instance, this meant their "geographical

horizons." Cities, even those not of the largest size, increasingly are able to communicate on their own with the world beyond their hinterlands. In the past, Gottmann noted: "The range of these relations seldom extended very far, unless the city was a political capital of substance, or a very active seaport" (GOTTMANN and HARPER, 1990, p. 11). Today, most cities and their regions have, or can have, truly far-flung connections. Those across the Atlantic are among the easiest to form.

As already suggested, the international involvement of US subnational units – cities, states, and metropolitan regions – with their European counterparts, despite the incongruency that does exist in American-European organizational forms, is what has actually been called, though from a central-government perspective and with NATO and especially the EU in mind, a "New Atlantic Community." This was the phrase employed by a former US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, when he said in Stuttgart in September 1996: "Closer political cooperation in the European Union, and its coming enlargement, will contribute to the security and prosperity of the New Atlantic Community and strengthen the partnership between Europe and the United States" (CHRISTOPHER, 1996). The "new Atlantic community" that I envision differs somewhat from such Washington-Brussels partnership thinking, and also from older, more elaborate conceptualizations such as the "Atlantica" plan put forward in 1963 by retired US Secretary of State Christian Herter (HERTER, 1963a). Atlanticism today is marked by the high degree of pluralism, or multi-centeredness, within it, and also by the non-hierarchical character of its structure. Its organization is more informal and implicit than formal and expressed. The newer concept implies a devolution of responsibility, as well as initiative, to non-central governments (NCGs) as well as to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and also to business enterprises and institutions such as museums, orchestras, and universities. The established structures of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the channels of regularized communication that increasingly join the United States government to the European Union will, of course, remain in place, for the coordination of overall defense and trade policy especially. But the locus of initiative in transatlantic relations will become, more and more, "localized."

"Communities" and "capitals"

A true "community," on any geographical scale, may be distinguished – partially in opposition to the Gottmann iconography-circulation model which does have an in-built centralist bias to it – by the norms of equality of status and opportunity for participation. Wide and general involvement is required, from the so-called peripheral areas of a society no less than from its center – its predominant metropolis or, on the international level, its most powerful country. Any human community of whatever size, almost by definition, should have more than one "center," lest it be overly *dirigiste*, such as the French political system, strongly centered on Paris, has appeared to be over the centuries. The transatlantic relationship, too, has seemed to be an "imperial" structure, with the United States, especially during the Cold War years, predominating heavily as the leading member of NATO (CALLEO, 1987). Both examples of overlordship, though inspiring in many ways, have been, from a community perspective, somewhat dispiriting.

Even very idealistic schemes, such as those for creating a transatlantic federation of some kind that were put forward at various times during the Cold War years, have an airless, freedom-less quality to them, whatever the stated liberalism of their associated rhetoric. One of these was Clarence K. Streit's *Union Now, A Proposal for an Atlantic Federal Union of the Free* (1949). Streit's and other such plans were efforts to try to replicate the formation of the United States of America on an international level, starting with the USA and the democratic countries of Western Europe. American federal thought was indeed an element in the ideology within which NATO was created, although the actual North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, if more than a traditional alliance, was not itself a federalist text (HENRIKSON, 1982; KAPLAN, 1984). An Atlantic Convention of NATO Nations, a gathering of citizens under the chairmanship of former Secretary of State Herter that took place in Paris in January 1962, produced a detailed blueprint (the "Declaration of Paris") for constructing a "true Atlantic Community" (HERTER, 1963b, pp. 79-90). This document provided for an executive body, a permanent High Council, and a High Court of Justice. An Atlantic Economic Community also was projected. Such an Atlantic Economic Community would not be closed, but "open to other nations of the free world."

A grand Atlantic Community of NATO Nations, had such a plan ever been adopted, would have been highly centralized, as the very notion of a High Council makes evident. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself was "a political center" that would be capable of acting in some areas even by a weighted majority vote. In other noteworthy ways, it should be allowed, the vision embodied in the Declaration of Paris was pluralistic. This was especially true of its references to the cultural sphere. The plan's authors traced the origins of the "magnificent civilization" that Atlantic peoples shared to the "early achievements" of the Near East, the "classical beauty" of Greece, the "juridical sagacity" of Rome, the "spiritual power" of religious tradition, the "humanism" of the Renaissance, and also the "discoveries" of modern science. The Declaration of Paris even included what, in the Gottmann sense, could be termed an iconographic proposal: "*Reconstruction of the Acropolis*," to make it "the symbol of our culture" and "the shrine of our Alliance" (HERTER, 1963b, p. 87).

The American relationship with what has evolved into the European Union, by contrast with NATO-based thinking, has developed much more along the lines of a "partnership" of separate equals. This concept of community was most influentially articulated by President John F. Kennedy in what has been described as his transatlantic "Grand Design" (KRAFT, 1962). In an address at Independence Hall in Philadelphia on July 4, 1962, President Kennedy reflected upon the American political system as one whose "checks and balances are designed to preserve the rights of the individual and the locality against preeminent central authority." As the effort for "independence" in the world was approaching a successful end, a great new effort for "interdependence," an idea also embodied in the US Constitution, was beginning.

This could most clearly be seen "across the Atlantic Ocean" among the nations of Western Europe. Kennedy conditionally offered to enter into practical discussions of "a concrete Atlantic partnership" if and as Europe moved to perfect its union, thereby forming an entity that would be capable of working, equally and interdependently, with the United States, the "old American Union." A "strong and united Europe," as the President foresaw, would be "a partner with whom we can deal on a basis of full equality in all the great and burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations." Forming "the more perfect union which will someday make this partnership possible" would not be easy, he acknowledged.

"But I will say here and now, on this Day of Independence, that the United States will be ready for a Declaration of Interdependence, that we will be prepared to discuss with a united Europe the ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership, a mutually beneficial partnership between the new union now emerging in Europe and the old American Union founded here 175 years ago" (KENNEDY, 1963).

In this "Design," in theory, the United States would be not on-



Fig. 12: Gottmann's Northeastern coastal Megalopolis of the United States, showing population density in 1960. (*Source:* Gottmann, 1961, inside front cover).

ly connected to but also counterbalanced by a consolidating Western Europe, thus ensuring the inner freedom as well as the outer force of Atlantic civilization.

. In the subsequent development of the US relationship with the European Communities, there has been much less actual connection than in the more solidary NATO context. The relationship between Washington and Brussels was not even made formal until the previously noted 1990 Transatlantic Declaration (TAD). The TAD itself was not given much programmatic content until the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) and Joint Action Plan (JAP) which did, fairly boldly, envisage a pragmatic, participant-oriented "New Transatlantic Marketplace" (though not a Transatlantic Free Trade Area, or TAFTA). The primary emphasis of the NTA/JAP was on private business relations rather than on governmental ties, at any level.

Relations between NCGs were simply not a leading agenda item. Nonetheless, in the last part of the JAP, "Building Bridges Across the Atlantic," there is the explicit urban recommendation: "encourage 'sister cities' to promote exchanges." Referring to the twinning of cities that had been going on across the Atlantic, as well as within Europe, during the whole period since the Second World War, this urban reference, though brief and even seemingly perfunctory, was recognized by city associations on both sides of the Atlantic as being important. It provided a larger formal framework for their future programmatic cooperation, as well as the prospect of funding. And it licensed, so to speak, a more general dialogue between city authorities on both sides of the Atlantic. The NTA/JAP initiative also emphasized the role of the urban-based private business sector, which through the recently formed Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) had contributed to the content of the NTA/JAP (COWLES, 2001).

Communities normally have capitals – in the case of nation-states, usually only one. National capitals, which are in most cases the largest cities of countries, traditionally have dominated Atlantic affairs. On the American side of the Atlantic, it has been Washington, DC, the administrative capital (HENRIKSON, 1983), and sometimes New York – taken together, the "London" or "Paris" equivalents in the United States – that have, separately or jointly, dominated the transatlantic dialogue, especially with regard to high political and financial matters. In order for the Atlantic world to develop further together as a community (fig. 12), other important urban centers – regionally prominent

cities on the seaboard such as Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, Charleston, Atlanta, and Miami, as well as powerful cities in the interior of the country such as Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Detroit, and Chicago – should be recognized for also having significant relationships with Europe. They can have actual leading functions as well. Chicago was, for example, the location of the second meeting, in November 1996, of the TABD. The initial, organizing conference for this influential group of some three hundred American and European chief executive officers, with government officials present, was held in Seville, Spain, in November 1995 (COWLES, 2001, pp. 243-253).

The "capital," in the sense of the heading-function that may be pertinent at the time, of the discussions of the Atlantic community can shift, in the United States no less than in Europe, from one center to another, though the term does, of course, normally refer to political, governmental headship. State and society must work together.

America's East Coast urban centers, for some of which external networks have often been of even greater importance than their immediate regional connections, have performed what Gottmann has termed a "hinge," or gateway, function as well. New York and Boston, with "their international linkages," stand out for him in this way (GOTTMANN, 1961, pp. 156-165; GOTTMANN and HARPER, 1990, p. 14): These and other coastal cities have helped to swing European and other continents' assets – investments as well as immigrants – toward America. They also have been pivots – "hubs" – for turning the attention of the United States outward and abroad, "circulating" American funds, products, and people toward port and other gateway cities on other continents. Many of these flows occur within regular transatlantic "orbits," as Gottmann describes these widening spirals of urban-centered activity (GOTTMANN and HARPER, 1990, pp. 257-259).

The participation of cities and their supportive regions in transatlantic community-building can today be, as they have been historically, direct and strong, and largely unmediated by the hierarchies of imperial command, national government, or international organization. The formal structures of NATO and of the developing US-EU relationship do provide guidance and context for transatlantic connecting, including, as recommended in the 1995 US-EU Joint Action Plan, further exchanges between "sister cities." But the cities have to do the exchanging on their own. And they do.

American non-central governments and international relations

The range of activities of American non-central governments – city, county, state, and also metropolitan-regional authorities – is increasing, and now extends even into what has traditionally been the sphere of "international relations," no longer a federal government preserve. To a degree, this has occurred at the behest of the US government. In 1956 President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed a people-to-people program at a White House conference intended, in the words of the subsequently created Sister Cities International (SCI), to "involve individuals and organized groups at all levels of society in citizen diplomacy, with the hope that personal relationships, fostered through sister city, county and state affiliations, would lessen the chance of future world conflicts." This began a "national initiative" of American NCGs overseas-affiliating (SISTER CITIES INTERNATIONAL, 1999, p. 2).

Of the total of some 2,020 foreign cities affiliated with US cities under SCI auspices by the end of 1999, the largest number, 723, were in Europe. During the 1990s the extent of SCI's network on the continent of Europe increased very considerably. Initially, most of the European cities chosen by US cities as partners were in Western Europe. In 1999 there were, for instance, 104 British cities, 105 French cities, and 157 German cities with linkages to US cities, in some cases more than one. With the end of the Cold War, the breakup of the Soviet bloc, and the general weakening of central authority within the former Soviet zone, non-central connections eastward and westward were possible. There was, consequently, a remarkable enlargement of US sister-city linkages, including some with cities in states that once were part of the USSR itself. For example, there were, by the end of the 1990s decade, 9 Czech cities, 8 Hungarian cities, 31 Polish cities, 25 Ukrainian cities, and 117 Russian cities having official ties with American cities as counterparts.

In most cases, the American and European cities that have thus paired up under SCI or other auspices are comparable in size and similar in character. Increasingly, economic, particularly business-driven associations produce city-to-city affiliations. Sometimes there are also "background" factors, such as historical links or ethnic ties, that may cause these to be formed. Current international diplomacy, too, occasionally can produce affiliations. A particularly interesting such connection, more fortuitous than others and having a high political content, is the one that was established between Dayton, Ohio, and Sarajevo in Bosnia-Herzegovina, once part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This no doubt was intended to help reinforce the peace agreement negotiated by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke at the sequestered site of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, near Dayton, in November 1995 (HOLBROOKE, 1999). The present Dayton-Sarajevo cooperative relationship indicates that "citizen diplomacy" at the city level can serve an international political function as well as those of cross-cultural understanding and community development.

American states, as well as cities, have engaged in supporting US policy in the context of American-European relations. An example is the continuing involvement of US National Guard units, based in states, in advising, training, and otherwise assisting countries that once were members of the Warsaw Pact. Called the State Partnership Program (SPP), this initiative of the National Guard Bureau began in 1993. It consists of a series of partnerships between the host nation and an American state, which operates under the National Guard Bureau, the US ambassador to the host nation, and the Joint Staff in the Pentagon. The following partnerships are illustrative: Illinois is associated with Poland, Ohio is associated with Hungary, Pennsylvania is associated with Lithuania, Vermont is associated with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Georgia, homonymously, is associated with the Republic of Georgia (UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND, STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM).

Despite these examples of political and even military local and state government involvement in Europe, the international presence of American NCGs in the past has been confined mainly to the tasks of trade, investment, and tourism promotion, and, to a lesser degree, cultural and educational activity. These traditional representational and exchange functions are well understood and are well documented (FRY, 1998; FRY, RADEBAUGH, and SOLDATOS, 1989; MICHELMANN and SOLDATOS, 1990; HOCKING, 1993). Many US states, and also the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, actually have established overseas offices, though not always continuously, in Europe and also in nearer Canada and Mexico, as well as in Asia (FRY, 1998, pp. 68-70). Although interest in the Western Hemisphere and in East Asia has been rising, interest in Europe has not declined. The European market is not only large but also relatively stable, and therefore likely to remain a major focus. States' overlapping interests in Europe have even led to formation of an association, the Council of American States in Europe (CASE). This functions as a coordinating agency for the approximately

30 US states that have offices in Europe. With CASE's help, "USA Trade Days" periodically are organized (FRY, 1998, pp. 75-76).

The role that non-central governments play in international relations, it should be recognized, remains subordinate. For the most part, NCGs must content themselves with exercising influence as "lobbies," acting upon national authorities either on their own or working through like-minded groups such as the National Governors' Association (NGA), US Conference of Mayors, or the National League of Cities. The NGA, for example, provided strong support for approval by Congress of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations and also renewal of "fast track" authority for the president to negotiate further trade agreements (FRY, 1998, p. 109). Later, both houses of Congress, mindful of the large US trade deficit and resulting unemployment in some states, voted to give President George W. Bush the requested Trade Promotion Authority, as "fast track" is now called.

The US Constitution assigns power over the conduct of international relations, including trade regulation and tariff collection, to the central government. Article 1, Section 8, of the Constitution gives to Congress the "power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises" and "to regulate commerce with foreign nations." There is a prevailing constitutional doctrine regarding foreign policy of "one voice" – that of the national government in Washington. Though the strength of this doctrine is being relaxed somewhat by lower-level judicial decisions and actual governmental practice today, it still is generally understood to be the case that the federal government "speaks for" the United States in international matters (HENKIN, 1972, pp. 15-28).

Nonetheless, non-central government leaders – principally, governors and mayors – now have distinct and important functions that can have a bearing on the international relations, even political relations, of the United States of America – if not on its "foreign policy" proper. One of these is their function, which should be much better recognized, as co-managers, together with leaders in Washington, of "symbols of American community" (MERRITT, 1966). There are important signs in Gottmann's portmanteau term, "iconography" – of *Atlantic*, as well as American, community that need, carefullly, to be handled, for they can have powerful effects.

Iconography, urbanity, and diplomacy

Many of America's icons, especially the more concrete ones, are site-specific – in contrast, for example, with such political and legal abstractions as the Declaration of Independence or the Constitution. We have seen, however, that even these abstractions can be associated, as they were by President Kennedy in his July 4 "Grand Design" speech, with a particular building in the City of Philadelphia.

The Statue of Liberty, mentioned at the outset to illustrate Gottmann's idea of social iconostasis, is both physical and metaphysical. Its formal name is "Liberty Enlightening the World" (fig. 13). The Statue is not only an American but also an Atlantic icon. It *faces* the Atlantic, and the world. Proposed by the historian Édouard de Laboulaye, designed by the sculptor Frédéric Auguste Bartholdi, donated by the people of France, the Statue of Liberty is derived from Mediterranean and Western archetypes, going back to the Colossus of Rhodes. Presented to the United States in Paris in 1884 and shipped to New York where it was assembled and ceremonially dedicated by President Grover Cleveland in 1886, it was intended as an expression of Revolutionary friendship and as a symbolic reminder of the liberty that citizens can enjoy under a free form of government.

To the poet Emma Lazarus, who called it "The New Colossus," it later became also a welcoming figure to immigrants. "Give me your tired, your poor,/Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free" – these words from her poem were inscribed at the foot of the Statue in 1903, making it thereafter an express signal of America as a refuge, a home for the oppressed. In the course of subsequent decades, reason was given – by restrictive US immigration policies and also xenophobic popular attitudes – to question the strength of Americans' commitment to this promise of liberty and safety. But the philosophical belief and the philanthropic wish remained, in part because they were reflected from across the ocean and were reinforced by European expectations of America's openness.



Fig. 13: New York – "Statue of Liberty Enlightening the World," 1886, by Edward P. Moran (1829-1901) – an Atlantic icon.

No city in America is as self-consciously emblematic as the nation's capital, Washington, the District of Columbia – intentionally designed by Thomas Jefferson and his planners as an iconographic city (CUMMINGS and PRICE, 1993; CRAIG et al., 1978). As Gilles Paquet has pointed out, with regard not only to Washington, DC, a capital city is "*a pattern of symbolic resources*" – a "terrain of realities" but also a "theatre of representations" (PAQUET, 1993).

A US President, though occupying a national office and constitutionally representing all of the people of the United States, acts somewhat as a local official when he situates himself authoritatively amidst the built symbols all around him in the capital. As Claude Raffestin asks, "Une capitale est-elle une sémiosphère nationale ou le lieu de mise en scène du pouvoir?" (RAFFESTIN, 1993).

The meaning of architectural and sculptural symbols is defined by their place, as well as by their purpose. It is also defined by their beholders. Political iconography, moreover, is not the preserve only of government officials or politicians. It also can be wielded by others who speak from positions of moral authority and public trust – a Reverend Martin Luther

King, for example, when he appeared as a private citizen in front of the Lincoln Memorial in 1963 (figs. 14, 15 and 16). Standing proudly before Daniel Chester French's marble statue of the Great Emancipator, he said: "I have a dream . . . ," to a quarter of a million immediate listeners, black and white – and to millions more Americans and others around the world. The Lincoln Memorial, the Mall, and the City of Washington together served as his megaphone. His voice was heard in Europe, and in 1964 he was invited to Oslo to receive the Nobel Peace Prize.

Other US cities too, notably New York, have functioned as public "sémiosphères" and as sounding-boards for policy. By projecting "identity" as well as power, city governments have hoped to increase the size of their markets, to draw in more investment, to bring in larger numbers of tourists, and also, sometimes, simply to make an impression. A "law and order" urban leader such as a former Mayor of New York, Rudolph Giuliani, sometimes conducted his office in a way that seemed purely willful, to assert his own and his city's primacy.

On occasion, as in October 1995, his assertive behavior produced embarrassment, for it interfered with American foreign policy. At that time the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Yasser Arafat, was visiting the city to attend the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, whose headquarters was situated there by international agreement (HENKIN, 1972, pp. 382-383, 396, 424 and 482). A special New York Philharmonic concert at the Lincoln Center had been arranged, and Arafat was to attend. The occasion – a highly iconographic one – suggested civility and ecumenism. The Mayor directed his aides to have the PLO leader removed from the event. The PLO delegation had been invited by the United Nations Protocol Office, but not by the local United Nations Host Committee! The City furthermore informed the United Nations that seven other "nations" not recognized by the United States would be excluded. "Diplomacy, Giuliani-style: Mayor has 'foreign policy' for local consumption," said the *Boston Globe* disapprovingly, if with a hint of respect for Giuliani's "brutish stylishness." It further observed: "Perhaps something strange inflames a mortal's senses when he takes command of a city so large, full of so many nationalities. As the site of the United Nations, New York City is, in a sense, the capital of the world, and so, would not that make its mayor something of a global potentate himself?" (KAPLAN, 1995).

The impact abroad of such demonstrations of metropolitan

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

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

Fig. 14: Aerial view showing the March on Washington at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, DC on 28 August, 1963, with 250,000 people fighting for pending civil rights laws.

Fig. 15: The Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. acknowledges the crowd at the Lincoln Memorial for his "I have a dream" speech during the March on Washington, DC, on 28 August, 1963.

Fig. 16: Stonecarver Andy DelGallo of Arlington, VA, readies a portion of Martin Luther King's "I have a dream" speech to be installed on the floor of the Lincoln Memorial, 23 July, 2003.

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

power and personal sway can be dramatic, comparable in effect to the symbolic assertions of America's national leaders. The "strong mayor" system of many US cities, New York above all, has itself become exemplary, especially within what Gottmann called the "vast transatlantic orbit" of urban discourse. This example has had perhaps its greatest effect in the United Kingdom where the Labour government under Prime Minister Tony Blair has sought to strengthen local government in order to make it more visible and accountable. The installation there of directly elected mayors in place of the traditional town councils, it was reasoned (partly on the basis of American experience), would facilitate the formation of public-private partnerships and intergovernmental coalitions. Mayor Giuliani himself was asked to comment on the Labour government's policy initiative.

Other American urban leaders, too, were invited to contribute to the reform discussion. To further the dialogue, the Local Government Association (LGA) in the UK held a seminar in March 1999 in London, titled "Models of Local Government: A Transatlantic Exchange," in which the mayors of Baltimore and Philadelphia and also other senior US local government personalities participated. There could hardly be a better example of Gottmann's "transatlantic orbit" of urban discussion, and of the community-building effect, at least in the realm of ideas, that it could have.

The most obvious outcome of the debate in Britain was the introduction of a "mayor plus assembly" form of governance for the greater London region. A new mayor of London – Ken Livingstone, an independent leftwing politician – was chosen on May 4, 2000, as the first directly elected executive in the United Kingdom. By British standards, Mayor Livingstone has a massive constituency. The 4.9 million citizens entitled to vote were a voting population equivalent to the combined constituencies of the 74 London Members of Parliament. The London mayor "will not surprisingly have a very high national and international profile – certainly a profile which will make most politicians in Westminster green with envy," read one British commentary (LOCAL GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATION, 1999). To some extent, as it was recognized, this represented an Americanization of British municipal government.

Actual participation in what might be called *municipal diplomacy*, connective and not just comparative, would be a further extension of urban influence abroad. The political scientist Ivo Duchacek uses the word "microdiplomacy," or "paradiplomacy," to refer to the processes and networks by which subnational governments deliberately seek to establish links with central governments and private enterprises at a distance (DUCHACEK, 1986).

Municipal foreign policy would be a suitable term for the even newer phenomenon of subnational authorities, speaking for the populations of cities and states or provinces they represent, taking formal positions on controversial international issues. In years past, most such controversial position-taking by non-central governments has concerned regions of the world or substantive issues remote from the concerns of Europe or America themselves. In the United States, city and state governments and their leaders have taken "foreign policy" stands on such questions as nuclear disarmament, stratospheric ozone preservation, the apartheid regime in South Africa, the status of Taiwan, the war in Vietnam, the Arab oil embargo, and – somewhat closer to home – relations with Cuba, revolution in Central America, and the future of Puerto Rico. Among the relatively few Europe-related topics that have been cited are the Northern Ireland conflict, Swiss banking practices, and recognition of "Macedonia," along with other Balkan issues. From the European side, there generally has been more for governments at every level to criticize: the US government's sanctions against Cuba, Libya, and Iran; its rejection of the Kyoto protocol on global warming; its opposition to the International Criminal Court; and, a matter internal to the United States itself, the adherence of some state governments to the death penalty.

A particularly controversial legislative measure adopted by one state – the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Burma Law, which discriminated in state government procurement policy against corporations, including many European ones, that did business with Myanmar (Burma) – was protested against by European companies primarily at the "European" level, as a matter of trade policy under the principles of the World Trade Organization. When tested in the US court system, the European Communities and their Member States joined in the American legal proceedings as *amici curiae*. The US Supreme Court finally ruled, if only on the narrow basis of federal supremacy, that the Massachusetts law was unconstitutional. The moral and political issues involved in the Burma case and others like it, however, cannot easily be settled, on either side of the Atlantic, because they involve profound differences of opinion within American and European society. There is a larger Atlantic intellectual and political sphere of discussion – a Gottmann "transatlantic orbit" for the circulation of ideas – that can, at times and over time, result in a community of thought and even of policy.

The Atlantic community and the impact of the September 11, 2001 attacks

No event since the Second World War or perhaps the Cuban Missile Crisis has so tested, and arguably also so demonstrated, the validity of the notion of an Atlantic community as did the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks, using hijacked airliners, on the World Trade Center in New York City (figs. 17 and 18) and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, on September 11, 2001.

Did those acts and, most relevantly here, the responses to them of Americans (figs. 19 to 22) and Europeans (figs. 23 to 27) as well as others around the world also prove the existence of an *integrated* Atlantic relationship, one in which not only transatlantic "we-feeling" but also mutual responsiveness, and actual cooperation, in decision making were evidenced (DEUTSCH et al., 1957, p. 9)? Most fundamentally, did the behavior of the United States along with its allies and friends in Europe, have an "Atlantic" character to it?

Both iconography and circulation came into play during the crisis. The former is, as Gottmann said, a stabilizing factor. And the latter, as he explained, is a movement factor. At the level of formal relations across the Atlantic, support was given almost at once. For the first time in its history, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, on the very next day after the attacks, invoked the all-for-one, one-for-all pledge of the 1949 Washington Treaty, Article 5 (BENNETT, 2001/2002). Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, said afterward in an address to the Atlantic Council in Washington: "The Alliance's historic decision on September 12 to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty underscored the profound link between two continents and among 19 nations. And it underlined our collective determination not to stand idly by, but to act." Who would have guessed, he went on to say, citing doubts of the proverbial "milkman from Omaha," that the Article 5 commitment would be invoked, 52 years after it was made, "after an attack on US soil." He itemized the kinds of help that the NATO allies were giving, much of it involving "circulation" in the larger Atlantic sphere: intelligence support, transit permission for military aircraft, access to ports and airfields, dispatch of elements of NATO's Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean, and also replacement with European capabilities of

Fig. 17: New York – The Statue of Liberty surrounded by boats with fireworks overhead on the occasion of the celebration of the centennial of Lady Liberty. It shows social and celebratory "circulation." (*Source: Northeast: Images of America,* New York, Gallery Books, 1987).



Fig. 18: New York – Nighttime photograph showing The Statue of Liberty in front of the Twin Towers – representing modern commercial and financial "circulation," with most of the office lights on. (*Source: New York: A Picture Memory,* New York, Crescent Books, 1990).

Fig. 19: New York – The Statue of Liberty and the smoke-filled sky in the background immediately after the terrorist attack of 11 September, 2001 on the World Trade Center. *(Source:* Cover of *NATO Review,* Winter (Dec./Jan./Feb.) 2001/2002.



Fig. 20: New York – A phoenix will rise from the ashes. *(Source:* "Recovery redefined," *The Economist,* 15 September, 2001, p. 66).

Fig. 21: New York – A message after the 11 September, 2001, terrorist attack. (*Source: The New York Times,* 21 September, 2001).



Fig. 22: New York – The twin beacons. *(Source: The Economist,* 26 January, 2002, p. 30).

some US assets in the Balkans.

"Most significant – and symbolic –" Robertson then added, "is the move of NATO AWACS airborne early warning aircraft from their base in Europe to replace US aircraft now being transferred to Asia" (fig. 24). As he explained: "This is NATO's first operational deployment in the United States: the old world coming to the aid of the new (fig. 25), to reverse the words of Winston Churchill" (ROBERTSON, 2001).

To illustrate the popular reaction of Europeans, Robertson noted that in Paris "the headlines read, 'We are all Americans now'" (ROBERTSON, 2001). What he did not mention is that in this much-referred-to article in *Le Monde* by Jean Marie Colombani the words, "Nous sommes tous Américains," are



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Fig. 23: "The fanatic cannot bear a city so civilized." (*Source:* Mario Vargas Llosa, "Out of Many, New York," with illustration by Angus McWilton, *The New York Times,* 11 December, 2001).



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Fig. 24: Take-off: Five NATO AWACS aircraft have been deployed in the United States to help with counter-terrorism operations. *(Source: The Economist,* 26 January, 2002).



Fig. 25: Cargo ships line up at Port Newark. Some 2,000 containers arrive in the United States every hour. Those involved in shipping fear that added security will cut deeply into gains in efficiency and cost. *(Source:* Steve Lohr, "How to keep cargo safe, and rolling," *The New York Times,* 27 May, 2002.



Fig. 26: "Nous sommes tous Américains. Nous sommes tous New-Yorkais!"

Fig. 27: Paris – 2002 Bastille Day celebration down the Champs d'Elysées in memory of the victims of September 11. The military parade was led by a contingent of more than 160 West Point Cadets, who were also invited guests of France. In the foreground is a New York City fire engine. (*Source: Magazine of the European Union,* no. 419, September 2002, p. 48.

immediately followed by the sentence, "Nous sommes tous New-Yorkais!" (fig. 26). The identification of Frenchmen and others in Europe was specifically made with a *city!* (fig. 27). Moreover, it was a reciprocal city identification. Colombani indicated that the declaration, "We all are New Yorkers," was prompted by recollection of John F. Kennedy's having declared himself, in 1963 in Berlin, "Berlinois" (COLOMBANI, 2001). President Kennedy (or his speechwriter) had been mindful of an even older precedent. Speaking before Berlin's City Hall on June 26 of that year he had said: "Two thousand years ago the proudest boast was 'Civis Romanus sum.' Today, in the world of freedom, the proudest boast is "Ich bin ein Berliner'" (SORENSEN, 1965, p. 677).

These interacting urban symbols provided stability – and also



Fig. 28: London – 7 September, 1940: the beginning of the London Blitz.

Fig. 29: London – 29 December, 1940: St. Paul's Cathedral emerges from the flames during one of the most devastating raids.

produced transtlantic unity. Even as the "icons" of the World Trade Center's Twin Towers collapsed in fire and smoke and part of the Pentagon was blown away, "another older, American icon," noted the Archbishop of Canterbury, George Carey, "was not submerged." Speaking in London from St. Paul's Cathedral, itself a survivor of terrifying bombardment from the air during the Second World War, Archbishop Carey said: "The September morning sun continued to shine on the Statue of Liberty, her torch raised like a beacon, a symbol of all that is best in America" (BARRY, 2001) (figs. 28, 29 and 30).

President George W. Bush, in his address to Congress on September 20, gratefully acknowledged "the outpouring of support" that was coming from all around the world. "America will never forget the sounds of our national anthem played at Buckingham Palace, on the streets of Paris and at Berlin's Brandenburg Gate" (figs. 31, 32 and 33). Nationals of some 80 other countries had been killed, including "hundreds of British citizens," he said in a gesture to Prime Minister Blair who was in the balcony: "America has no truer friend than Great Britain. Once again we are joined together in a great cause. I'm so honored the British prime minister has crossed the ocean to show his unity with America. Thank you for coming, friend." President Bush welcomed as well the presence of "two leaders who embody the extraordinary spirit of all New Yorkers: Governor George Pataki and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani." He went on to affirm, putting the capacity of the federal government behind the country's pre-eminent municipality: "As a symbol of America's resolve, my administration will work with Congress and these two leaders to show the world that we will rebuild New York City" (BUSH, 2001).

Not only did iconography have to be reconstructed. Circulation, which had been brought almost to a stop by the trauma of September 11, had to be restored. The impact on commercial airlines was devastating. British Airways, Europe's largest





Fig. 30: New York – 11 September, 2001.

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

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Figs. 31, 32 and 33: September 11 memorial services near Big Ben, London, Notre Dame, Paris and the Brandenburg Gate, Berlin (with a sign "Wir trauen – our deepest sympathy"). *(Source: Europe: Magazine of the European Union,* October 2001).



Fig. 34: European inland waterway network starting at Rotterdam.

carrier, announced almost at once that it would lay off one-eighth of its work force, drop 10 percent of its flights, and mothball 20 planes. Following September 11, the price of its shares declined 42 percent. Other European, and also American, airlines suffered the same or worse setbacks, with most of the smaller ones being left on the brink of actual bankruptcy (COWELL, 2001). Transatlantic and global shipping also suffered a major blow, not only because of the general reduction in business activity resulting from the crisis but also because of the sharply heightened concerns about port security and the sufficiency of inspection procedures.

Fig. 35: Rotterdam, The Netherlands – The huge Regina Maersk" (longer than the Eiffel Tower is high), which will carry container goods between Western Europe and Southeast Asia.

The containerization of international shipping – now the method by which roughly 90 percent of the world's cargo is transported – implied an enormous new task of surveillance. "The reality is that the system is vulnerable," frankly acknowledged US Customs Commissioner Robert Bonner. "If an international terrorist organization uses a container to wreak havoc by concealing and detonating a weapon of mass destruction, the system of international trade is going to come to a halt" (ALDEN, 2002) (figs. 34 and 35).

Circulation, like iconography, no longer could be taken for granted. Confidence needed to be rebuilt, and quickly. Within the transportation sector itself, urgent measures were taken,



Fig. 36: Map of the evolving Atlantic Rim.



Fig. 37: Map showing North America and Europe interconnected by all sorts of lines (shipping, air, communications links). It shows how relatively "dense" this modern web of interconnection is. It is, in a sense, Gottmann's "circulation," updated, on the transatlantic level.



Fig. 38: A "narrow" Atlantic Ocean lying between North America and Europe. *(Source: NATO Review,* Spring/Summer 2000).

using new technological means as well as added personnel, so as to tighten inspection systems. Most innovatively – and most indicative of an underlying "community" relationship – agreements were made to begin to "push the border" back for inspection of goods. Under such agreements US agents could inspect shipments in European and other ports even before they left the dock. This opportunity and privilege would be reciprocated. "Point-of-origin" inspections, with the cooperation of the private companies involved, might even be carried out at the factory level. Furthermore, the tracking of shipments by satellite, using transponders, would be instituted on a wider scale. The result would be a "fast and slow lanes" pattern for cargo shipment, with the speed determined by the security rating given (LOHR, 2002).

The transatlantic shipping and air cargo realm, though no longer the biggest trading orbit in the world today (owing to the rise of Asian production), would become a major beneficiary of these developments. The largest and most efficient of America's and Europe's ports and airports, rather than smaller ones that might lose business as the new security and clearance standards spread, are likely to be commercial winners. By stages that are hard to predict, the Atlantic trading orbit may take a new shape in the future, just as infrastructure and iconography change (figs. 36 and 37).

No amount of iconographic interrelation or circulatory connection can overcome the physical Atlantic itself, its actual geography (figs. 38 and 39). This is a classical subject, partly of Platonic origin (RAMAGE, 1978; CUNLIFFE, 2001, pp. 1-18), which Jean Gottmann knew and loved. The still somewhat mythic Atlantic distance, which is legendary and historical as well as oceanic, can, however, be bridged. As I have emphasized, the organizational structures of the North Atlantic Alliance and, in an ever-closer approximation, the U.S.-EU relationship, too, do provide important frameworks for cooperation at the international level. At the subnational level as well, as has been shown, very significant links have been formed. As the impact of September 11 makes even clearer today, city-to-city rela-



Fig. 39: Germany, with some of its architectural "icons," looking out across a foreshortened Atlantic, designed by *INSIGHT/*Peter Yuill following Saul Steinberg. *(Source:* Lufthansa).

tionships can become city-to-country relationships, and even city-to-continent relationships.

As a coda, a brief "Atlantic" community story, merging iconography and circulation, may be told. On February 13, 2002, former New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, having finally won the hearts of much of Europe and even the world, was made "Sir Rudy" by Queen Elizabeth II in London. "Fighting Terror, Global Honor," as the press saw it *(Boston Globe,* 2002). He was flown over to Buckingham Palace to receive his honorary knighthood on a supersonic British Airways jet, the British- and French-designed Concorde (figs. 40 and 41). "One of the many dreams that I have had, this is one I have always dreamed, of flying on the Concorde," he said. With him were two others who represented, to many, the new human "twin pillars" of New York: the retired police and fire commissioners of New York City, both named Commanders of the British Empire. One of Giuliani's further purposes in London, and subsequently in the Netherlands and Germany, was to raise money for the Twin Towers Fund for the benefit of families of the rescue workers who were killed on September 11. "In human life, having friends means a great deal; it gets you through the tragedies of life," he said. "The same is true of nations" (HERSZENHORN, 2002).



Fig. 40: The Concorde in flight in its prime.

Fig. 41: London – The last Concorde owned by British Airways is raised from a barge to be displayed outside the Houses of Parliament, as it travels to Scotland, 13 April, 2004.

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