

Africa and globalization: What perspectives for the future of the continent?

"In his famous work, Jean Gottmann said that: '... National politics is built not only upon what exists or doesn't exist inside the border of a country, but upon what is found or not found in other countries whom the former has relationships with ...' In the context we are analyzing, we are talking about a continent, Africa, that is trying to rebuild these relationships on a new basis, in order to get out of its geopolitical and economic isolation and identify its role in the international scene."

Alessia Turco

The author has a Ph.D in Geography obtained from the University of Pau, France. She is studying the territorialization processes in Africa, with regard both to macro-economics dynamics of development and to management of hydraulic resources in an arid and dry tropical context. She has spent long periods of time in Burkina Faso, Niger and Egypt, where she worked with international organizations. She is currently doing a Post-Doctorate at the University of Bologna; she is an Associate Researcher of the Centre d'Etudes et de Documentation Economiques, Juridiques et Sociales (CEDEJ), Cairo, Egypt.

Introduction

Africa is, once more, going through an extremely difficult period of its recent history. The new scenarios that, on a world basis, are emerging in the framework of the new and dangerous international juncture are leading, in fact, to an even stronger reduction of the attention level of the challenges that the Continent has to face daily. We are talking about wars, sanitary emergencies, poverty and, of course, underdevelopment. But we are also considering the efforts that, in the last three years, African leaders have made to give the world a picture of Africa more and more determined to see things with a prospective of globalization and, most notably, no longer eager to pay only the costs of it.

In this perspective, the *New Partnership for Africa's Development* (NEPAD)¹ is the pivot around which the project of the re-launch of the Continent is revolving.² The NEPAD, that initially was presented with the name of New African Initiative (NAI), is the result of the merging of two projects presented in the previous year:

- the *Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Program* (MAP), elaborated by Presidents T. Mbeki, A. Bouteflika and O. Obasanjo; and,
- the *Omega Plan* (Dakar – June 2001), sponsored by the Prime Minister of Senegal A. Wade.³

The Plan was first presented at the G8 meeting in Genoa (and

positively welcomed even though maybe not with the attention it deserved) and later re-elaborated before being newly discussed during the last G8 meeting in Canada.

In his famous work, Jean Gottmann said that: "... National politics is built not only upon what exists or doesn't exist inside the border of a country, but upon what is found or not found in other countries whom the former has relationships with ..." ⁴ In the context we are analyzing, we are talking about a continent, Africa, that is trying to rebuild these relationships on a new basis, in order to get out of its geopolitical and economic isolation and identify its role in the international scene.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development

The *New Partnership for Africa's Development* has to be seen in this perspective. We try here to present the most significant elements of this document and to understand its importance for the future of the Continent.

Contents

The NEPAD is characterized by two significant aspects:

- First of all, quoting the words reported in the document, it is meant to be a real project of economic development "of Africa for Africa" that declares a direct and conscious commitment by the African *leaders* who are determined to lift Africa from the plague of poverty and underdevelopment: "This New Partnership for Africa's Development is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development, and at the same time to participate actively in the world economy and body politic. The Program is anchored on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalizing world." (Art. 1)⁵
- In the second place, it aims at marking an important change in the way of conceiving the relationship between North and

South, going from a logic of support, that has characterized the development cooperation in the last 40 years, to a logic of partnership that can create advantages for both parties. Articles 185, 186 and 187 of the Plan, while underlining the necessity of a commitment intended to develop and strengthen the partnerships,⁶ say that: "The manner in which development assistance is delivered in itself creates serious problems for developing countries. The need to negotiate and account separately to donors supporting the same sector or program is both cumbersome and inefficient. Also, the tying of development assistance generates further inefficiencies. The appeal is for a new relationship that takes the country programs as a point of departure. The new relationship should set out mutually agreed performance targets and standards for both donor and recipient. There are many cases that clearly show that the failure of projects is not caused only by the poor performance of recipients, but also by bad advice given by donors." (Art. 186)

More specifically, article 188 of the Plan points out a list of responsibilities and obligations that the developed countries and institutions have to take charge of. We name some of the 12: "To support materially mechanisms for and processes of conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa, as well as peacekeeping initiatives; to accelerate debt reduction for heavily indebted African countries, in conjunction with more effective poverty reduction programs ...; To reverse the decline in ODA [Overseas Development Administration] flows to Africa and to meet the target level of ODA flows equivalent to 0.7 per cent of each developed country's gross national product (GNP) within an agreed period. Increased aid flows will be used to complement funds released by debt reduction for accelerating the fight against poverty; To translate into concrete commitments the international strategies adopted in the fields of education and health; To facilitate the development of a partnership between countries, international pharmaceutical corporations and civil society organizations to urgently secure access to existing drugs for Africans suffering from infectious diseases; To set up coordinated mechanisms to combat corruption effectively, as well as commit themselves to the return of monies (proceeds) of such practices to Africa ..." (Art. 188)

We can therefore state that the whole document is based upon two main aspects.

- First of all, the urgency of outlining strategies capable of consolidating the process of democratization that, although already started in some countries (Senegal, Mali, and the sub-Saharan giants Nigeria or South Africa and others) have problems to "take off" in a disruptive way on a continental level.⁷ If these conditions are not present, there is a risk that the project will die in the beginning phase, victim of an ideological totalitarianism and so to say "patrimonial" that has characterized public life in Africa for 40 years and that prevents the economic development of the Continent.⁸ In other terms, the risk of failure of the entire operation is great, due to the lack of a culture of freedom, transparency and participation in the society of many African countries.

- In the second place there is the economic growth that, in this new scenario, has to be interpreted in its wider sense of sustainability of development, meaning the economic growth associated with a sustainable use of the resources in a context of social equity.⁹

The stake

Considering its contents, here very shortly presented, the *New Partnership for Africa's Development* shows, without any doubt, its importance. Its approach and strategy makes it an absolutely innovative project compared to those imagined and accomplished in the past: the NEPAD is by any means an analytical plan for development "made by Africans for Africans,"

with figures, data, proposals, arguments, goals and priorities. The involvement of the international community is certainly necessary but its intervention is not expected to be just an entity, an organization that transfers funds to the south of the world, but in the form of a multilateral collaboration that allows the creation of a worldwide partnership capable of creating advantages for all parties.¹⁰

This extensive document contains not only statements of principles but also and mainly concrete proposals that confer an important value on the work carried out by African leaders. In fact, the success of this ambitious plan is connected not only to the future of Africa but also to its credibility. Besides its economic significance, in fact, the NEPAD is promoting a real political project of "rebirth" of the continent, the so-called *African Renaissance*,¹¹ greatly supported by the South African president Thabo Mbeki.¹² In an article published in the newspaper *La Repubblica* during the tumultuous days of the G8 meeting in Genoa, he clearly outlines the essential points of his political vision: "... as site where the whole humankind had its origin, Africa has an unpaired role as privileged location for the affirmation of the common humanity of all the people, no matter the race, the color, the gender or the nationality. The ancient African history, including the hearth creation itself, the birth and the evolution of life and mankind, the human society, arts, mathematics, architecture and medicine, must teach us Africans that who affirmed that we are less human, lied ..." ¹³ With these touching words, Mbeki recognizes the importance of the challenge that the African populations are facing today, but above all he recognizes that democracy, capitalism, globalization are some of the most important aspects that make the Western World the most significant example of these very same political and economic systems.¹⁴

But also the memory of the geopolitical events of African history and also the derangement and inequalities that they have produced cannot be avoided.¹⁵ Mbeki himself emphasizes how colonialism has contributed to the creation: "... of an image of Africa as a continent keen on war, dictatorship, negation of human rights, corruption and always dependent on aid ..." The NEPAD has the explicit purpose to put an end to this situation of marginalization.

It is useful to make some considerations about this last issue. The modalities of the organization and structuring of the African territory imposed by the colonial powers during their domination originate in a heterocentric logic; the Europeans make their moves according to their political project aiming at reinforcing their international position. This happens through the construction of social and political schemes and economic systems that gradually replace the systems that, for centuries, have governed the basic organization of African communities (autocentric territorial logic).¹⁶ The structures of legitimacy, the institutions and the pre-existent values are emptied of their content, dismantled, or even made slave to the political and economic needs of the imperial powers.¹⁷

The NEPAD is very explicit about this point (articles 21 and ff), and in particular when the failure of the post-colonial experience is recognized: "... Post-colonial Africa inherited weak states and dysfunctional economies that were further aggravated by poor leadership, corruption and bad governance in many countries ..." is reported in article 22. In fact, the "clash" happens at the time of Independence and later: the very same territorial structures used, just before, to satisfy the needs of a precise political pattern, are inherited by the new States which start their project of emancipation around them.¹⁸ The authoritarianism, the centrality of the State, the corruption, the negation of human rights and the lack of democracy are the most evident consequences of the new political asset, but also the marginality of the continent and its total dependence on international aid.¹⁹

The NEPAD tries to take care of all these problems by proposing a project of economic development supported by a political vision that puts in the foreground a fundamental issue: democracy. About this, in article 47 of the plan it states that: "... The agenda is based on national and regional priorities and development plans that must be prepared through participatory processes involving the people. We believe that while African leaders derive their mandates from their people ..."

In this perspective, the concept of democracy as a project, the activation of efficient mechanisms able to achieve its institutionalization on a continental level, the respect of these very same institutions become a real strategic goal.²⁰

Certainly, the emergence of important personalities in the African political world and the campaign for promoting the image of the continent in different international happenings, are the sign of the deep changes that are coming into being in this direction.²¹ It is not by chance that the NEPAD is the work of a different "generation" of African leaders. These leaders, thanks to the democratic respectability acquired through regular elections, act on the African and international scene obscuring the dictators, golpists, and generals who held power without having a legitimate political representation.²² The intentions are absolutely positive and propulsive; nevertheless, by considering those criteria of democracy and participation so intensively proclaimed, one might wonder how many people of this "African mass" that Mbeki talks about in different parts of his article are really aware of this grandiose project of political, economic and social emancipation. "The New Partnership for Africa's Development centers around African ownership and management ..." and more, "... NEPAD is based on the agenda set by African peoples through their own initiatives and of their own volition, to shape their own destiny," is written with emphasis in articles 47 and 48; but which Africans are we talking about? The intellectuals, the strategists and the statesmen or rather the citizens, the tradesmen, the artisans, the peasants, the common people, the "African masses"?

The NEPAD addresses them and creates great expectations; but we wonder, to what extent Africans are aware of its existence, or even more, as J.L. Touadi says: "... how much, those people who mostly suffer the consequences of the macro-economic policies of the governments and inspired by the international financial institutions, have participated in the elaboration of the plan?"²³

This very last aspect brings to the foreground more issues to reflect upon, directly involving the "territorial aspects" of the plan. We refer, by saying that, to the way through which the NEPAD proposes to meet the territorial needs of the populations, the needs of social reproduction within their old and deeply rooted cultural frames. According to a merely territorial perspective, it is essential to focus on the fact that any intervention or action of sustainable development, as the NEPAD wants to endorse, must necessarily include an anchorage to the geographical context on which to act because, for different reasons, it is in the territorial dimension that the information indispensable to define the modality of intervention can be identified. This is, for sure, one of the most critical elements of a development project that does not take into account the issue, if not in a very marginal way in articles 143 and 144: "... The New Partnership for Africa's Development leaders will take urgent steps to ensure that indigenous knowledge in Africa is protected through appropriate legislation." The NEPAD does not contain any reference to the question of the involvement of the local communities, the modality of their participation, the valorization of the social, juridical, political and territorial context in which they have developed. The international debate itself that, for some years, involves the issues of cooperation in development does not seem to be taken into great consideration.²⁴ On the other hand, the choice to give the NEPAD a

neoliberal denotation raises the risk of not satisfying the primary needs of the populations by the elaboration of an economic model able to transform them from passive element to main actor of the *renaissance* and able to give value to their resources.

Finally it is important to bring to light a last issue. Apart from being a document, the NEPAD is a real and articulated structure made of different organisms (art. 201-204): an Achievement Committee, composed of the presidents initiating the Plan, and by 10 other Heads of State, a Steering Committee, a High Authority for the NEPAD, a General Panafrican Commission, a Continental Director, a Council of Governors.²⁵ Regarding this aspect, we cannot avoid facing a prickly matter: the problems that could arise as a consequence of the decisions of a supranational organization, the NEPAD, within the different States (fig. 1). Even if it is true that, as Jean Gottmann said "... no political unit spread on wide areas has lasted long without realizing [inside its borders] some sort of decentralization," it is also a fact that "every State seems to be diffident regarding the perspective of leaving a part of its sovereignty in the hands of a supranational authority."²⁶ The African States, actually, seem to be very tied to their national prerogatives and it is still to be verified how keen they are on seeing their national sovereignty reduced in topics like the free circulation of goods and people, the homogenization of fiscal policy, juridical control and so on.²⁷

The international debate: Contrasting reactions

Looking back to the international dimension, the NEPAD, as we said, was presented for the first time at the G8 meeting in Genoa in 2001. This is, for sure, a positive fact as it is the sign of a "take in charge" by the International Community. Regarding this, in some documents that appeared on the official sites of the meeting, the intention of the G8 to support the basic issues of the plan such as democracy, prevention and reduction of conflicts, increase of the commercial exchanges within Africa and between Africa and the world and so on, is clearly underlined.²⁸ During the last year the meetings and summits have followed each other in order to finalize strategies of actions and to trace the guidelines for the role and position of the African and international private sector within the NEPAD.²⁹ It is worth lingering on what happened during the last G8 meeting in Kananaskis, in Canada, where in June 2002, Africa, represented by the Presidents of South Africa, Algeria, Nigeria and Senegal, was summoned by the world's Great powers to definitively seal this development project.³⁰

According to the plan, the Africans did not go to Canada to ask for help; they wanted the commitment to a collaboration where everyone must play their role in creating favorable conditions for international investments. A goal of the NEPAD is, in fact (as specified in articles 146-147), to reach a level of annual growth of 7 percent expected by the objectives of international development and, most of all, halve the share of poverty in Africa by 2015. To achieve this aim the continent has to fill up an annual deficit of 12 percent of its GNP, corresponding to 64 billion dollars. The richest countries of the world are requested to collaborate on two most important plans, according to the suggestions by A. Wade: the financial plan, concerning investment in the Great infrastructures of "pre-industrialization" (streets, harbors, railways); and the normative plan that regards specifically the integration of the African countries in the international commercial system and in the world economy. On the other hand the Africans commit themselves to the creation of a new juridical and institutional framework able to guarantee good *governance*: promote peace and stability,




Fig. 1: New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) – Examples of projects for sub-regional areas.

democracy, respect for human rights, management of the economy that is transparent and effective.

These are ambitious goals; the same secretary of the United Nations Kofi Annan, a convinced supporter of the plan, has declared on several occasions that we should not have unrealistic expectations.³¹ And, in fact, the demands of the Africans were handled with care by the G8 which, during the meeting, created an Action Plan for Africa full of declarations of principles but was lacking in concrete and significant measures.³²

Here, in brief, are the contents of this Action Plan. As far as financial support is concerned, the Big of the world will continue to manage aid by themselves; they commit themselves to giving Africa, by 2006, at least half of the supplementary public help to the development (APS) promised at the Monterrey Conference (Mexico) in March 2002: 6 billion dollars per year.³³ In figures, Europe gives, on average, 0.33 percent of

its GNP to the APS, while, within the G8 the percentage is much lower, 0.19 percent; the United States follow with a modest 0.10 percent.

Apart from this, the Plan refers back to already existing actions and programs. First of all, the G8 is committed to supporting Africa in the intervention to manage the armed conflicts, referring in particular to the acts of peace and security in Congo, Sudan, Angola and the region of the Great Lakes. When it comes to debt, the document talks about a contribution of 1 billion dollars for its cancellation to be given to 40 of the poorest countries of the world with a very high debt, 22 of which are African. This measure is part of the program "Very Indebted Poor Country" approved at the G7 in Cologne in 1999. The issue of access to the markets of the rich countries and aid to agriculture is faced only marginally and postponed to the never-ending negotiations of the WTO. The program

"Education for All" elaborated by the World Bank (Dakar, April 2000) with the purpose of giving access to primary school to 125 million children does not receive the necessary attention, if not in terms of a vague commitment of the G8 to support the African countries in the efforts made to increase the quality of education. The sanitary emergency remains unchanged; the Big of the world are committed to "help Africa to defeat the effects of HIV/Aids" and to "... sustain her in the struggle for the set-up of efficient sanitary structures"; also in this case money is not an issue. Finally, in its last paragraph, the document spends some words on the water problem and on the possible implications if managed in a strategic way, exhorting once more the continent to improve the efficiency of the hydraulic policy.

This is, synthetically, what Africa obtained in Canada: "a Great Action Plan that, unfortunately, lacks of action" is the comment of some. The rich countries are reluctant to make concessions and this because of a simple and openly declared reason: they do not have enough guarantees that Africans are able to fulfil their obligations to secure peace, democracy and correct administration. Indeed, the *good governance* issue is the pivotal point for the entire Action Plan; the document dedicates the whole introduction to this specific matter, identifying, in the *governance* and in the fine-tuning of the legislative and institutional instruments essential for the reinforcement of the democratic structures, a real parameter of evaluation. This becomes a crucial aspect in the prospective of the elaboration of a worldwide partnership based on new rules that find their foundation on the transparency and efficient management of resources. The G8, therefore, supports and shares the objectives of the NEPAD, gives expression to its commitment to create forms of partnership with the African countries, but the choice of these partners is based on the results achieved in the matter of *governance*. As can be read in the document: "... the struggles will be concentrated on those countries that will show political and financial attachment towards *good governance*, that invest in their own human resources and that will try to pursue that kind of politics finalized at stimulating economic growth and reducing poverty."

As said before, the partnership presented in the document is going to be neither indulging nor rhetorical but, instead, precise and demanding. And it is exactly this point that raises a question. On the African side, the mechanism of control over the processes of democratization and over the activation of procedure able to realize its institutionalization on a continental scale is optional and, until now, no system of sanctions exists. What does the NEPAD have more than the beautiful promises of democracy so often pronounced by African governments? But a similar consideration can be made for the rich countries. As we know, the best way to "help the Africans to help themselves" is buy its products; now, President George Bush recently increased the subsidies to American agriculture by 80 percent, and also the EU has recently taken some measures in the matter of agriculture within the Community. Given this scenario, it becomes kind of rhetorical to think that the Great of the World will support the initiatives of the NEPAD.

Conclusion

The *New Partnership for Africa's Development* is proposed, in the intentions of the leaders who elaborated it, as a tool that could really change the destiny of Africa. As we have said several times, it puts as the center of its objectives the reinforcement of democratic institutions and the respect for human rights as essential conditions for cutting the vicious circle of poverty and underdevelopment and giving a start to the process of economic growth that the continent needs to get out of the long lasting outsider condition.

Nevertheless, as we have seen, the NEPAD can be looked at with critical eyes, both from the methodological point of view and from that of the general ideas; the same International Community expresses its skepticism about the requests brought up by the African representatives and asks for stronger guarantees. Furthermore there is the fact that this development plan today finds an international conjunction that is not very keen on preparing the way for its success. The dramatic events of September 11 and the winds of war that are blowing today in the Middle East are increasing the political and economic isolation of the continent. The new geopolitical assets that are emerging on a world-wide level follow the strict rule according to which the different countries are more or less important with respect to the position that they take in the war that America has declared on terrorism and, what is more important, to their direct involvement.³⁴ Of course, going back to Africa, right after the Manhattan attacks, A. Wade promoted an "African Pact against Terrorism" signed by 27 State leaders, and almost all the African leaders did not fail to emphasize, in a series of declarations, their support and their collaboration to the United States in this new emergency. Nevertheless, there is a concrete risk that Africa will be transformed into a real battlefield. Countries like Somalia, Sudan and others can become the target of an America that wants, at any cost, to destroy, according to its own vision of the problem, all the terrorist organizations spread all over the world. And, on the other hand, the present conflict in Iraq fully reflects this convulsive situation that creates specific dynamics for which the United States has renewed attention for the continent. This attention is motivated, first of all, by great interest for oil.³⁵ In September 2002, 11 African State leaders were in Washington to discuss new aid, investments, the fight against HIV/Aids, all of this in exchange for energy resources. Unavoidably, the new "tempting" orientation of American policy could have serious drawbacks with regard to the efforts that, although with great difficulty, were becoming more concrete to defeat corruption, repression, attempts to destroy democracy that for a long time have prevented Africa from having relief from poverty and underdevelopment.

Adding to all of this is the fact that the NEPAD must be financed by the International Community in order to give positive and satisfactory results; now we are in an epoch in which the world economic systems of the rich countries are based on financial investments that aim at paying high rents in a short term: what is the interest in investing in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Zambia or Botswana where, in any case, the profitability of investments is low and the risks of failure of the operations is high? On the other hand, it is important to remember that many African countries are still torn apart by bloody conflicts that anyway could undermine the efforts made by the promoters of the NEPAD.

The NEPAD is, of course, an ambitious project. The difficulties that can be seen on the horizon are several and they are even more serious because Africa is today, as said before, in a galloping context of globalization that does not leave space for forms of idealism and even less space for long-term program plans. Nevertheless, to quote Jean Gottmann once again, "the international morals [political] consist in allowing change, in preventing a population using acquired positions from having too many advantages with regard to others; but it demands as well that the chance is granted to every Nation, to keep what it acquired in the past ..."³⁶ The bet is high; the NEPAD, in fact, facing crucial questions such as democracy, respect for human rights, the sustainability of economic development (articles 42-49), could really represent an opportunity of reprisal for the continent.

Notes

1. The NEPAD document is available on the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) web site: <http://www.uneca.org/>.
2. The NEPAD has an important place in the set of events that in Johannesburg in July 1992 brought to birth the new African Union. Constituent act, finalities, structure and participant members are found on the web site: <http://www.oau-oua.org/>.
3. The MAP is available on the UNECA web site; the OMEGA Plan has its own web site: <http://www.omegaplan.com/>.
4. J. Gottmann, *La politique des États et leur géographie* (Paris, Armand Colin, 1952), p. 7.
5. For an analysis of the contents of the Plan see Al. Turco, "NEPAD, una via africana allo sviluppo," *Terra d'Africa 2002* (Milan, Unicopli, 2002), pp. 271-298.
6. "The various partnerships between Africa and the industrialised countries on the one hand, and multilateral institutions on the other, will be maintained. The partnerships in question include, among others: the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s; the Africa-Europe Summit's Cairo Plan of Action; the World Bank-led Strategic Partnership with Africa; the International Monetary Fund-led Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers; the Japan-led Tokyo Agenda for Action; the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act of the United States; and the Economic Commission on Africa-led Global Compact with Africa. The objective will be to rationalise these partnerships and to ensure that real benefits to Africa flow from them" (Art. 187).
7. On this subject, see: *Démocraties certes et encore fragiles, mais les libertés fondamentales sont en expansion à travers le Continent*, Coalition Mondiale pour l'Afrique, Rapport Annuel 2000/2001.
8. J.F. Bayart, *L'État en Afrique. La politique du ventre* (Paris, Fayard, 1989).
9. I. Ikeme, *Sustainable Development, Globalization and Africa: Plugging the Holes*, in: <http://www.afbis.com/analysis>.
10. On this subject, the Article 5 says that: "The New Partnership for Africa's Development calls for the reversal of this abnormal situation by changing the relationship that underpins it. Africans are appealing neither for the further entrenchment of dependency through aid, nor for marginal concessions."
11. Article 47: "Through this program, African leaders are setting an agenda for the renewal of the continent."
12. For a critical analysis of the South African President's thinking, see R. Ajulu, "Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance in a globalizing world economy: the struggle for the soul of the continent," *Review of African Political Economy*, 87, 2001.
13. Mbeki, "Il mal d'Africa e i suoi tutori," *La Repubblica*, 18/07/2001.
14. Many articles and literature have been written in recent years about globalization. Besides the most successful books, for example: N. Klein, *No Logo* (Toronto, Knopf Canada 2000), Z. Bauman, *Globalization: the Human Consequences* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1998) we consider relevant to name: A. Bonomi, *Il trionfo della moltitudine. Forme e conflitti della società che viene* (Milan, Bollati-Boringhieri, 1998); Id., *La comunità maledetta* (Turin, Edizioni Comunità, 2002). Referring specifically to the African question, we can mention "Globalization and African responses," *Review of African Political Economy*, 85, 2000 (special issue).
15. On this subject, see Articles 18-27, 52 of the Plan.
16. On this topic, refer to A. Turco, *Africa subsahariana ... op. cit.*, in particular Chap. 11.
17. Id., "Strutture di legittimità nella territorializzazione malinké dell'Alto Niger (Rep. di Guinea)," in E. Casti and An. Turco (eds.), *Culture dell'alterità. Il territorio africano e le sue rappresentazioni* (Milan, Unicopli, 1998), pp. 13-60; V. Berdoulay and O. Soubeyran, "Milieu et colonisation dans le contexte de la modernité," in V. Berdoulay and O. Soubeyran (eds.), *Milieu, colonisation et développement durable* (Paris, L'Harmattan, 2000), pp. 15-17.
18. An. Turco, *Africa subsahariana ... op. cit.*
19. R. Klitgaard, *Combattere la corruption* (Paris, Nouveaux Horizons, 1988).
20. Starting from the fact that the concepts of "space" and "place" are strongly present in the dissertations concerning the modern theory of democracy, E. Entrikin explores the possibility of the existence of a real "geography of democracy," but he observes that: "... place and space work as metaphors, as a way of understanding someone's place in a social, political and cultural perspective. As metaphors, they lose their specificity of concrete spaces and places, but acquire semantic flexibility and rhetorical efficiency for the theoretical dissertation" (p. 190). Refer to: N. Entrikin, "Le langage géographique dans la théorie démocratique," in J. Lévy and M. Lussault (eds.), *Logiques de l'espace, esprit des lieux* (Paris, Belin, 2000, p. 190); refer also for a wider view: V. Berdoulay, "Le lieu et l'espace public," *Cahiers de Géographie du Québec*, 114, 1997; V. Berdoulay and N. Entrikin, "Lieu et sujet. Perspectives théoriques," *L'espace géographique*, 2, 1998.
21. Consider, for example, the presentation of the Plan at the G8 meeting in Genoa (July 2001), the WTO summit in Doha (November 2001), the latest G8 meetings in Kananaskis, Canada, Evian, France and Sea Island, United States.
22. We refer to T. Mbeki, of course, but also to A. Wade (Senegal), A. Bouteflika (Algeria), O. Obasanjo (Nigeria), A.O. Konaré (Mali). See, on this matter, the dossier: AA. VV., "Globe Trotters," *L'autre Afrique*, 2001, no. 7, pp. 8-15.
23. J.L. Touadi, "Nuova iniziativa per l'Africa. È il modello giusto?" *Nigrizia*, 2002, no. 2, pp. 24-25.
24. We refer in particular to the "decentralized cooperation," innovative tool for "support to development" carried out according to the principles of sustainable development.
25. On this matter, it is important to name the document published during the summit of Abuja, in October 2001, and available on the website of UNECA.
26. J. Gottmann, *op. cit.*, p. 193.
27. The debate on the common currency finds place in this frame. This issue is a part of the more general political picture carried on by the African Union. Actually, the monetary integration, as we have seen in Europe, is an essential component of economic integration: it is difficult to imagine an increase of the exchange and economic growth within the Continent considering the actual circulation of so different and floating currencies, mostly not exchangeable one into the other.
28. The official site of the summit in Genoa: <http://www.genoa-g8.it/>.
29. We refer to the WTO summit in Doha, November 2001, to the summit in Dakar, January 2002 and the one in Addis Ababa, April 2002.
30. Refer to the official site of the meeting: <http://www.g8.gc.ca/kananaskis/afraction-fr.asp>.
31. *Le Monde*, 30.6.2002.
32. The Action Plan for Africa is entirely available on the official site of the event.
33. See the web site: www.un.org/esa/ffd.
34. An. Turco, "L'Africa e l'11 Settembre," *Terra d'Africa* (Milan, Unicopli, 2002), p. 14.
35. About this matter read the arguments exposed by: An. Turco, "Gli amici di Bush," *Nigrizia*, December 2002, pp. 26-28.
36. J. Gottmann, *op. cit.*, p. 189.