

# The identity of modern Chinese migrants from Hong Kong to Vancouver, Canada

"Even more than Shanghai, Taipei or Singapore, Hong Kong is diffusing its sociocultural models to overseas Chinese communities, while its economic performances, even if they have recently slowed down, still make this city the hub of the diaspora and even of the Chinese world. And regarding the apparent exile of the Hong Kong elite, it would seem today to correspond more to a reinforcing of a global presence, all the colonies forming that way a *Hanse* of modern times revolving around this Asian major pole. At the same time, these migrants, approaching the planet from a supra-national way and according to their habits no matter their country of residence, could foreshadow a globalizing and multi-residential trend which will more and more characterize behavior of a fortunate ubiquist elite in a close future."

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## Introduction

In a single generation of baby-boomers only, themselves descending from refugees (from the neighboring Province of Guangdong and, to a lesser extent, from Shanghai) who left China during the civil war of the mid-20th century, a parallel Chinese identity and culture have been developing in the Sino-British enclave of Hong Kong to become an example for the Chinese of all around the world. However, in the 1980s, the delicate political climate of the colony ended up in an exile without precedent, in particular in the metropolitan area of Vancouver where the global context was going to meet the local one. It is precisely this Hongkongese particularity, the motivations for these "luxury refugees" to move and, more than anything else, their consequences on the concept of migrant that is the issue and the focus of this short exploration.

## Chinese both peripheral and central

### A cultural mix between East and West

The identity of the people of Hong Kong is the fruit of an original mix, born from the meeting of Eastern and Western ways of thinking. However, in order to be fully understood, it is necessary to approach this crossing from two overlapping dimensions, the bicultural one and the multicultural one. On the one hand, their society is a hybrid of colonial and local traditions, marrying British institutional and juridical strictness to Cantonese discipline and pragmatism, in particular through professionals educated according to an Anglo-Saxon way. On the other hand, one must think of Hong Kong as a place of permanent stir between Sino-Asian and Anglo-European cultures because of its hub position vis-à-vis both the diaspora and the global economy (HAMILTON, 1999). Today the inhabitants of the Special Administrative Region (SAR) are proud of this singularity which differentiates them from their Mainland "brothers." In other words, like the ambiguous identity characteristic of their overseas compatriots, even if they are ethnically Chinese, they first feel Hongkongese. In a way, historical, linguistic, familial or sentimental bonds with the country of origin are obvious, especially regarding old generations who grew up there, where they still have their roots. But the ones who spent their entire life in this city that they made themselves, identify with "her." At the same time, for them and even more for their descendants, the ancestral land is a *terra incognita*. Indeed, eternally marginal vis-à-vis their spiritual mother, they built another Chinese identity, more flexible and more open to foreigners. For instance, their system has been founded on values (like individual freedom, economic rationality or gender equality) and languages (Cantonese and English), quite different from those of the Communists. This identity switch can even be felt in the terminology used by the Pekinese to name those

former "Compatriots of Hong Kong and Macao" (*Gang Ao Tongbao*) who slowly became "Hongkongese" (*Xianggang Ren*). Moreover, its location of enclave-hub gave this place a unique culture admired by the whole diaspora.

### A model for the diaspora

More specifically, starting in the early 1980s, the sudden opportunities that this financial hub offered, suited the colony's young professionals and business people who developed a real cult of materialism there (SIU, 1999). The capitalist lifestyle started by these *nouveaux riches* is based on two principles, the obsessive search for profit and, at the same time, for novelty. They themselves structure the two fundamental and related aspects of their existence, work and consumption. This demand made the creation of parallel cultural models possible, in regard to high-tech leisure or ready-to-wear for example. And, even adapted from imported styles, the avant-garde spirit of the Hong Kong designers, like the Japanese ones, goes further than only copying. Furthermore, in particular through the diffusion of its culture within the diaspora, Hong Kong became part of the world giants in fashion and moviemaking, while reinforcing the ambiguity of its position both peripheral and central in the Chinese world. On the one hand, even in the hands of the Mandarins, its "re-sinization" should go with its affirmation as a major ingredient of the socio-economic models valued by the People's Republic. On the other hand, this island outskirts of Beijing is really one of the main engines of modern Chinese culture, a popular ultra-urban and ultra-consumerist culture which ties siblings up in a virtual global China.

### A modern and capitalist Chineseness

Just thinking of the concept of Chineseness testifies to an outsider approach, mainly Western and academic. However, Chineseness generally refers to cultural aspects legitimized by history characteristic of the country named China, but also to the less concrete common points existing among all ethnic Chinese worldwide (WANG, 1999). Regarding current Hong Kong, describing what is Chinese, and what is not, is not an easy task. First, its citizens have a double face, apparently more modern and less traditional than their "cousins" of Formosa. Notably, mass consumption as a reason of being, base of their professional and recreational culture, would touch Hong Kong society more than the Taiwan one. Furthermore, even if its very British side was for long opposed to the plurality of colonial Shanghai, its Westernization is more noticeable today than in its northern neighborhood. For example, more than its system, its strong Christian minority differs from Buddhist Chinese land. Moreover, contrary to what is spoken in Taipei, the English language is definitely part of the ex-colony's daily life (at school or at work in particular), even if less than in the admired independent state of Singapore. Finally, this city shows little interest in the issue of Chinese unity. However, we saw how the "Fragrant Harbour" (*Heung Gong*) recently built a second model of universal Chineseness founded on free enterprise, creativity and the privileged location of a world economic hub. As a result, Hong Kong seems to be keeping the role its spiritual mother was holding before World War Two, projecting to overseas Chinese the image of a desirable modernity. On the other hand, according to Pekinese elites, the greed of those ignorant superurbans certainly does not help erecting the monument of "pure" Chineseness, the one of art and literature. But Cantonese people, now envied middlemen, did not forget Confucius' moral and if it was not for them and the diaspora networks, intellectual Chinese milieux would not have survived the Cold War between Taipei and Beijing (MAKIO, 1998). And, by the way, this thirst for possession is

even truer of the current People's Republic of China crowds than its capitalist outskirts, which have already partly reached the stage of the necessary to enter the superfluous one. Also, in the rest of the country, the language spoken in Hong Kong is not considered more than a simple dialect. But in reality Cantonese is in many respects a national language, on which a global life model has been built. Consequently, the Chineseness of Hong Kong, like the one of its peripheries (Overseas China) defines itself essentially by a capitalist global way of functioning and a certain modernity. By modernity is meant an anti-traditional Chineseness, as opposed to a Western partial imagery still often persuaded of the archaism of so-called Chinese norms. Therefore, after having described Hong Kong Chinese cultural identity, it would seem now legitimate to question ourselves on the why of their recent emigration.


## Migrations between Hong Kong and Vancouver

### A massive exile in the pre-handover climate

The emigration of Hong Kong capitalists during the 1980s and 1990s needs to be replaced in the context of the British colony of then. Especially, the officialization of its handover (BASIC LAW AGREEMENT, 1984) and, more than anything else, the "Beijing Spring" were the events provoking a massive exile. Indeed, the idea of belonging to a communist country after 1997 did not seduce business people still living with the memories of the 1949 revolution. To a certain extent, Hong Kong people were becoming stateless since, differing from other "dissident" Chinese identities, they would not reach sovereignty. Furthermore, if their particular political status was not really recognized by the new rules, they themselves did never identify with a China that they never belonged to (SIU, 1999). However, their fear was first an economic one, since they were viewing their businesses as in danger, and even more fortunes earned during the 1980s in the very lucrative local real estate (OLDS and YEUNG, 1999). That is why they developed a strategy announcing a new geopolitical era, consisting of making multiple investments in more reassuring political and economic horizons. At the same time, some English-speaking new countries were desperately seeking willing investors who could "dope" their economy.

In particular, during the 1980s, in response to the recession their country was going through, a lot of Canadian decision makers were thinking that the long-term growth key was to look for a capital and an enterprise spirit of Hong Kong synonymous with economic prodigy. This is how, in 1987, Ottawa and the Provinces started the new version of their Business Immigration Program, allowing anybody who would invest about half a million Canadian dollars to settle in Canada with his family and obtain citizenship after three years of residence only. This passport attraction for the "modest" cost of a middle-class flat in Hong Kong was going to be prolific since Canada was chosen by the major part of these rich people in exile, i.e. more than 250,000 of them between 1987 and 1996 (CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, 1990-1998). That way, three times more of them were tempted by Canada than by nearer Australia or prestigious United States (fig.1).

It is true that not all the newcomers from the colony belonged to this "business class." However, from 1987 to 1996, nearly half of them immigrated to Canada under this label (CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, 1999). And in absolute numbers, Toronto comes slightly ahead of Vancouver as a receptacle of this migration as a whole. But since the population of Great Toronto is two times bigger than that of Great Vancouver, the capitalist wave seems to have marked off the Western metropolis in a more ostentatious way, especially be-



### Husband's "life polygon"

- Business headquarters
- Business factories
- Current official residence
- Former official residence

### Wife's "life polygon"

- Present permanent resident
- Residence of parents/sister
- Former residence/brother's residence
- Residence during years of study

- ↔ Current commuting home/work
- ↔ Former commuting home/work
- Commuting headquarters/production center
- ☐ Long-distance work
- Lived space  
(home – school/children's activities – mall)
- Current family life
- Former family life
- ☐ Long-distance communication

Fig. 1: Life polygons of a Hong Kong "astronaut" family. (Source: Interviews Vancouver 2001).

cause the last one received the biggest amount of “yacht people” of the entire country – two times more Chinese business immigrants than Toronto (CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, 1988-1998; STATISTICS CANADA, 1997). And it is not chance but the result of seducing publicity from the politicians of this region, specifically during the World Expo of 1986, which showed the natural and multicultural advantages of a Pacific city relatively closer to the Far East than the Ontarian giant. Therefore, the biggest part (around 40 percent) of economic migrants entering Canada between 1987 and 1997, coming in their majority from Hong Kong, chose British Columbia (and even the Vancouver area to be more exact), representing in our case almost 50,000 business men and their families (CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, 1988-1998). Moreover, their “flashy” concentration in the suburban municipality of Richmond reinforces the reality of the pioneer concept of “ethnoburb,” created by the geographer Wei Li to label the Taiwanese suburb of Los Angeles (Monterey Park), and more generally cultural enclaves emerging in the outskirts of the Northern American metropolis (LI, 1998). The new Richmond is characterized by the growth of shopping malls where owners, salesmen, but also products and customers are mainly Chinese, and even Hongkongese. However, this flow was meant to dry up as fast as it happened, forcing the researcher to think of the concept of migration under a more global angle.

### Return migration and the life polygon

The inversion of the migratory trend between the Sino-British archipelago and Canada concerns more specifically “expatriated” business immigrants who, after having officially stayed in the country just long enough to obtain citizenship, returned to the city still haunted by its reputation of building fortunes in one night. The Hong Kong trend of the late 1990s would indeed correspond to the return of the *Huayi* or “foreign citizens of Chinese descent.” The exact number of people involved in this move is difficult to tell since, owning both Canadian and Hongkongese identification cards, they can come and go as they please without any strict means of control for the authorities of each political entity. However, according to three approximations made by three organisms of the SAR (the Immigration Department, the Canadian Consulate and the Chinese-Canadian Association), there would be between 150,000 and 200,000 Chinese there holding Canadian passports. In other words, at least half of those who left for this trans-Pacific state would now be officially Hong Kong residents, at least part of the year. It seems reasonable to think that in this number are certainly included businessmen living between both sides of the Pacific Ocean and those who came back for good. Anyway, all together with all the ones holding foreign citizenship, they represent a latent potential for a new exodus in case of a drastic change of Beijing’s politics. No matter what happens, the destiny of these people, in particular during the last 50 years, is noticeable for its hypermobility and a global presence fairly amazing, both easier to understand through the concept of the life polygon, created by the French geographer Jean-Baptiste Humeau about the Gypsies in France (HUMEAU, 1995). Regarding Hong Kong migration, it could define itself like the main hubs structuring the space of the Hong Kong diaspora. The understanding of this virtual territory is quite appropriate for Chinese dynasties scattered all around the world to enter. On the other hand, thinking their life only at a local scale would give a partial and wrong view of their reality. In this supranational country, it is easy and relatively common to slide from one region to the other according to possibilities sought and the diverse political and economic situations. Then state borders do not signify much for an ethnic group following opportunities offered by the different poles of “its” territory.

To clarify our purpose, I will take the case of a woman born in Hong Kong in the mid-1950s with parents coming from Guangdong Province. Part of the upper-class, both her father and mother working in publishing, she naturally studied computing in the United States before getting a job as an engineer in her native city and becoming rich doing property speculation during the 1980s. A few years later, following the fashionable trend in the colony, she and her husband moved to Vancouver, after a disappointing stay in Australia. Today, she is well-off, living in an upper-class neighborhood of Vancouver where she takes care full-time of her children’s education, while her husband, when he is around, manages his Hong Kong business through the web.

## A migrant elite above political borders

### Trans-Pacific household and capital accumulation


Indeed, the huge human move occurring in the British possession of the Far East during the 1990s was meant to be more ambiguous than it seemed, since typically the business people left while staying at the same time (WONG, 1999). In fact, one of the first goals of this emigration was to obtain the citizenship of an English-speaking developed country, i.e. a political status and a certain social prestige which would allow them to return to Hong Kong in a position of superiority vis-à-vis local institutions under communist domination. Therefore, having to make an impossible choice between safety and profit, a lot of Chinese capitalists built a global strategy in which they would keep their job in Asia while moving overseas. This phenomenon became rapidly common within Hong Kong Chinese communities of Canada, Australia or New Zealand. The commutings resulting from such an arrangement, in which the family money earner spends his time between Vancouver and Hong Kong for instance, made these migrants receive the different nicknames of “astronauts: (or *tai kong*), “transnational cosmopolitan” or “transilient migrant” (RICHMOND, 1991; MITCHELL, 1995) (fig. 2).

However, this family spreading seems to be simply following Chinese traditional work migrations and reminds us of the bachelor migration to the New World of a century ago. But at least three fundamental characteristics differentiate this one from the old one:

- First, in the contemporary scheme, it is not the man who is migrating but his family;
- Second, the current one concerns by and large an elite migration;
- Third, modern communication and transportation means make the two sides of the Pacific Ocean “closer.”

The prolific and recent literature about this topic insisted mainly on the global mobility, the flexibility and the economic power specific to these Hong Kong middle and upper classes (MITCHELL, 1995; ONG and NONINI, 1997; OLDS and YEUNG, 1998). Consequently, Vancouver is not only a long-term resort for Chinese stockholders but also a dorm-city for this jet set of entrepreneurs commuting between their Oriental headquarters and their official trans-ocean residence. This is the reason why the majority of business immigrants living in British Columbia would not work there and a fair amount of them would work in the country of origin (LEY, 2000). But in reality, this attitude would be the result of a planned strategy (WATERS, 2001).

In order to understand this purpose, let us put the notions of financial and human capital in perspective. Indeed, it is necessary to keep in mind that the haemorrhage Hong Kong society suffered in the 1990s first touched the business bourgeoisie



### Neighborhoods



Business



Residential



Academic

### "Amusement Parks"



Beach resort  
(M: Mediterranean)



Snow resort



Cultural resort

### Means of transportation/communication



Shuttle downtown/suburbs



Shuttle work area/leisure area



E-work (at home)/Virtual presence somewhere else

**Fig. 2:** A futurist "world city." (Source: Fournel, 2001).

and the "brains," meaning the richest and most educated people, and also the ones its future was depending on. More precisely, typical fugitives were yuppie families moving to North America, and not the Chinese guest worker caricatured rural, uneducated and single. Surely, such quality immigration in the new countries was not exclusive to the Hongkongese. More generally, this was the growing trend of newcomers from comparable Asian nations, regarding either their level of development, their governmental fragility or the pressure existing on workers. Also those nations, in particular Taiwan, Singapore or South Korea, share a Confucian culture specific to Chinese civilization. But, Canadian or Australian seeking of a miracle suited particularly well the profile of entrepreneurs whose political and cultural specificity, of British pupils kicked out by a red dictatorship, was just emphasizing. Indeed, they already had capital which made them safe anyway, no matter their final destination. In particular, holding geographically diversified investments, Anglo-Saxon degrees internationally recognized and elite professional relations all over the world (*guanxi*), they possessed what the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1979) calls respectively economic capital, cultural capital and social capital. It is then quite easy to imagine that the one owning simultaneously these three forms of capital has got multiple residential options allowing him great territorial adaptability. So, the main issue would seem to be regarding the territorial identity of those families transplanted from one side to the other of their *mare nostrum*.

### What spatial and national belonging?

Facing such a moving skill, it seems quite difficult to extract fundamental principles about the relationship of Hong Kong people with their national space.

- First, they are simultaneously proud of their Chineseness, their material achievement and their "domestication" of distances or of the Earth's political dimension, allowing themselves to travel from one entity to another as they please.
- Second, even if they are Chinese, they do not identify with their Motherland, either the traditional one which is "back" again or the adoptive one.
- Third, this eternal moving around, which does not seem to be slowing down, is obviously hindering any sort of permanent settling inside a unique land and a unique culture.

On the contrary, by joining the transnational capitalist world, not only borders but also national identities make less sense. This is why one needs to admit the existence of a migrant identity in itself, emanating from a deliberate strategy of repeated migration and, consequently, not tied to one but several places at the same time. To a certain extent, this migrant identity would witness a lifestyle based on geographical mobility and family global dispersal. In a way, it is a little as if nomadism (or more exactly multi-residency) would be preferred to sedentarity, until believing that these modern nomads possess ubiquity skills. Furthermore, the attitude of these transnational whole members fairly differs from traditional immigration and emigration concepts. In North America, these "sky knights" are neither economic immigrants nor "reluctant exiles" (SKELDON, 1994). It looks quite indispensable then to add to the immigrant/emigrant paradigm the idea of a migrant living above territories. In particular, belonging to strong international social networks makes optional integration at a local level perceived as transitory (HIEBERT, 2000).

However, there is a question remaining, the one concerning the national conscience of those multi-skilled beings. It is true that at a time when having simultaneously several cultural belongings is becoming a growing norm, collecting many identities should not perturb individuals too much. But these migratory birds do not develop this attachment to their country as

much as inhabitants of nation-states. It is indeed fairly hard to define the "at home" concept of people descending from rural ancestors from Guangdong Province, having grown in the ultra-urban environment of Hong Kong during a period of great changes and now spending most of their time in a multicultural metropolis of an English-speaking new country, while traveling frequently all over the world for business. However, even though they are living on a different planet than the ordinary mortal, these Hongkongese would suffer an identity crisis related to the fragility of their allegiance to a precise land. In other words, even with their legendary capacity to juggle from one identity to another, these world citizens would suffer from a loss of roots. At the same time, this new sort of comers in rich countries is opposed to the usual perception of White people on "their" land, i.e. exclusively composed of poor people attracted by the hope of better days.

## Another North-American identity

### A postmodern Asian

Breaking with the conventional hypothesis of the American Dream, the attraction of Hong Kong immigrants in North America could have two main explanations:

- On the one hand, their move needs to be conceived as the logical next step of half a century's exemplary social and economic climbing, a form of crowning of their success. They would correspond to what Morikawa Makio calls postmodern Asians, i.e. individuals who, after having succeeded on the financial level, are now seeking a better quality of life for themselves and their children (MAKIO, 1998). Their new preoccupations include especially access to a more balanced school system for their children and also a bigger and healthier living space. Indeed, one needs to be aware that in Hong Kong owning a house is no more than an impossible dream for the middle-class. Therefore, differing from the usual immigrants, these ones do not come to Canada to achieve the American Dream any more since the majority either do not need to work to live, because they are retired or rich enough, or continue their professional activities in the Far East (LEY, 2000). For them, Vancouver (and even more the city of Richmond hosting an international airport connected several times daily to their native city) has become a sort of residential upper-class suburb of Hong Kong, even if remaining a very particular one. In other words, in Hong Kong waiting to migrate to one of their English-speaking country communities first signifies crossing a superior rank in the social scale. Moreover, during the 1990s, their society was affected by the move to Vancouver, a little like a chic fashion seducing the local bourgeoisie. However, in their mind, this Canadian top did not imply leaving their habits or their belongings. It would then remain, to a certain extent, an overseas extension of their base camp.

- On the other hand, in Canada, these quite extreme Orientals find themselves in a society with a lot of aspects similar to theirs. So there they can follow a lifestyle close to the one they had before. In particular, for middle-class families of the island city, living in a suburban residence, shopping in malls, going around driving or spending nights eating out or watching television at home do not represent either a change or a cultural shock. Here is another reason for them not to feel the need to adapt to host country norms. They then contribute to building a modern Chinese identity in Canada. And if for many North Americans such an adaptation seems extraordinary, putting their motherland in its contemporary economic context and as a center of an ultra-developed community helps to relativize their so-called feat (MAKIO, 1998; HAMILTON, 1999). More generally, this phenomenon is only the reflection of a new era where modernization is not completely synonymous with West-



ernization since advanced societies do not only exist in Europe or in North America but also in Asia. Furthermore, their global tropism is revolutionizing notions of "here" and "there" since their "somewhere else" fairly resembles their home.

### Living in Vancouver like in Hong Kong

Considering Vancouver like a simple extension of Hong Kong, the migrants took with them their cultural models. Therefore, even though millionaires, educated and migrants in their soul, they paradoxically keep a strong attachment to their lifestyle overseas. More exactly, they obviously prefer the commercial atmosphere or the gastronomy of their homeland to the one conventionally offered in their host country. It could be interesting then to explore the significance lying behind such strong consumption habits. Especially, this importation in the metropolitan landscape of ultra-urban island practices is obvious through their frequentation of recently erected shopping malls of Richmond. Comparing them with the original ones is quite amazing acknowledging the fact that this transplantation sticks out with a strong desire of reproduction, either way in the toponymy, the type of goods or services offered, the modest size of the shops or even the visual, audial or sweet-smelling environment. This mimetism seduces Sino-Canadian customers who feel at home in those malls since they represent a universe in which they have their unconscious landmarks. And consumerist mass culture or the centrality of malls in their leisure, both specific to Hong Kong people, have their foundation in the uniqueness of the capitalist enclave. Many complementary hypotheses can explain such behavior:

- First, Hong Kong people work hard and a lot earn as much money as possible. Therefore, the few rest hours of the night or of the weekend are spent shopping or going out, overspending money, allowing in a certain way the permanent stress to be overcome.
- Second, the crampedness of private space makes any sort of social life at home very difficult.
- Third, shopping malls made in Hong Kong concentrate at the same time stores, restaurants, karaoke-bars and video game temples, that way satisfying any generation. Notably, it is in those places that people meet friends or family at night or on Sundays around an appetizing dinner. It would by the way seem that Chinese in general, and Hongkongese in particular, appreciate eating out even more than any other nation. French geographer Emmanuel Ma-Mung even sees in those places of conviviality a key function in keeping alive the ethnic identity of these people (MA-MUNG, 1992).
- Fourth, one needs to add to this a certain pragmatism which consists in taking advantage of rare free time.
- Fifth, this attitude is the direct reflection of purely urban habits as, differing from most of global cities, the lack of space in Hong Kong makes the escape to the countryside at the weekend almost impossible without flying.

However, the purpose is not to justify the shopping trend by natural determinism; evidently it also reflects the aspirations of this bourgeoisie. One needs to keep in mind indeed that the ex-colony's economic success is quite recent, a few decades at the most and that it was mostly achieved by descendants of refugees. So, the values they admire are mainly *nouveaux riches* ones and it is not so surprising that they are first concerned with material well-being and image. Under those conditions, spending one's free time seeking the newest electronic gadget on sale is often perceived as the only exciting thing to do, showing also a certain herd mentality characteristic of a society where people are very preoccupied with being as fashionable as the others.

### Conclusion

This long but enlightening digression being closed, the reader understands better why, even in a Vancouver context completely opposed to the one of the Hong Kong crowd, migrants continue to prioritize values they received and that they think are best, i.e. materialistic values contributing to the apology and the cult of social image. And it would not be too wrong to assert that mass consumption is a cultural feature most exacerbated among overseas Chinese than North Americans themselves whom sociologists call shopaholics. And many witnesses report that being immersed in a climate similar to their little motherland would be one of the main reasons why Vancouver is favored by many of those Asians, vis-à-vis Chinese San Francisco, judged too traditional for instance.

Even more than Shanghai, Taipei or Singapore, Hong Kong is diffusing its socio-cultural models to overseas Chinese communities, while its economic performances, even if they have recently slowed down, still make this city the hub of the diaspora and even of the Chinese world. And regarding the apparent exile of the Hong Kong elite, it would seem today to correspond more to a reinforcing of a global presence, all the colonies forming that way a *Hanse* of modern times revolving around this Asian major pole. At the same time, these migrants, approaching the planet from a supra-national way and according to their habits no matter their country of residence, could foreshadow a globalizing and multi-residential trend which will more and more characterize behavior of a fortunate ubiquitous elite in a close future.

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